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The Litigation Budget
Jay Tidmarsh*
Because of fears that litigation is too costly, reduction of litigation
expenses has been the touchstone of procedural reform for the past thirty years.
In certain circumstances, however, the parties have incentives—both rational
and irrational—to spend more on a lawsuit than the social benefits that the case
provides. Present and proposed reform efforts do not adequately address these
incentives, and, in some instances, exacerbate the parties’ incentives to
overspend. The best way to ensure that the cost of a lawsuit does not exceed the
benefits that it provides to the parties and society is to control spending directly:
to require the parties to file and live within litigation budgets. These “costs
budgets,” which are already in use in the United Kingdom, help to ensure that
the costs of litigation remain less than the benefits. After describing the
workings of a costs-budget system, the Article considers practical, political, and
constitutional critiques. None of these concerns is disabling. American
rulemakers who are serious about containing the litigation costs should grant
courts the power to use costs budgets.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A controversial set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will likely come into effect within six months. 1 A principal
object of the proposed changes is to limit the amount of information that
parties can obtain during discovery. 2 No one who is advocating
1.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has approved the amendments, which are
now pending before the Supreme Court. The Court is expected to approve the amendments in April
2015, with an effective date of December 1, 2015. Although Congress may enact legislation
preventing the implementation of amendments to the Federal Rules, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012),
it rarely does so. The progress of the amendments through the rulemaking process can be followed
on the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts at Pending Rules
Amendments, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/pending-rules.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/B3XU-JBEU (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
2.
See Memorandum from the Honorable David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, to the Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3
(May 2, 2014), available at http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/civil_rules_advisory_
comm__report_to_standing_committee_may_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KM8D-P62Q
(noting that the goal of the amendments is to “reduc[e] cost and delay[ ] by advancing cooperation
among the parties, proportionality in the use of available procedures, and early and active judicial
case management”). Specifically, a proposed amendment to Rule 26 would eliminate a party’s
ability to obtain discovery “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Compare FED. R.
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discovery limitations is suggesting that party access to information is
inherently bad. 3 In theory, more information should lead to a better
resolution of a dispute. The perceived problem is that obtaining
information can be expensive, so that, in the eyes of some, the value of
the information discovered is not always worth its cost. 4
This impulse—to prevent excessive expenditure on litigation—
also underlies recent judicial efforts to raise the pleading bar. Noting
that “proceeding to . . . discovery can be expensive” 5 and that “the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side,” 6 the Supreme Court has imposed a “requirement of
plausibility” on complaints filed in federal court. 7 If parties could obtain
CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting this discovery on a showing of “good cause”), with Memorandum, supra,
at 20 (recommending an amendment that eliminates “subject matter” discovery). Another
amendment emphasizes the need for discovery to be proportional to the lawsuit. Id. (proposing to
amend FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii)). A third makes clearer the court’s power to require a
requesting party to pay for discovery. Id. at 20–21 (proposing to amend FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B)).
In addition to these amendments to Rule 26, the Advisory Committee considered other
limitations on discovery. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (2013), available at http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/
files/2013/11/Published-Rules-Package-Civil-Rules-Only.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TN8LBWK3. These proposals included reducing the number of depositions from a presumptive
maximum of ten to a presumptive maximum of five and the presumptive length of the deposition
from seven hours to six, id. at 300–01, 303 (proposing to amend FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i),
30(d)(1), and 31(a)(2)(A)(i)); reducing the presumptive number of interrogatories from twenty-five
to fifteen, id. at 305 (proposing to amend FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1)); and imposing a presumptive
limit of twenty-five requests for admission, id. at 291, 310–11 (proposing to FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(A) and to add new Rule 36(a)(2)). These proposals were not voted out of the Advisory
Committee. Memorandum, supra, at 3.
3.
Discovery raises concerns about the disclosure of trade secrets or other confidential
information. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 464–74 (1991) (describing harms to privacy and property interests
caused by broad discovery). These concerns did not appear to motivate the present proposals to
constrict discovery; rather, the concern was to keep the costs of discovery proportional to the nature
of the case. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UHW8-QN7R (noting
that the proposed amendments responded to calls to “reduc[e] cost and delay in civil litigation”).
4.
See Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5–10 (detailing reasons for curtailing certain
discovery, and noting “widespread support . . . for the proposition that discovery should be limited
to what is proportional to the needs of the case”).
5.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
6.
Id. at 559.
7.
Id. at 560; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (detailing the analysis
used to determine if a complaint meets the “plausibility standard”). Iqbal involved a lawsuit
against government officials. Although the case did not involve information whose discovery would
have been expensive in monetary terms, the Court noted other costs that the “plausibility” bar
helped to avoid: “Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts
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information at modest cost, this restrictive approach to pleadings would
be unnecessary.
The same story could be told over and over. The central theme
in the past thirty years of American procedural reform—with its rise of
case management and its emphasis on proportional discovery—has
been the effort to keep litigation costs under control. 8 As the frequent
waves of reform suggest, the effort to date appears not to have been
especially successful. 9 One reason may be that rulemakers are
responding to the myth of outsized litigation costs rather than to the
reality of a system that functions reasonably well. 10 To the extent that
a “litigation cost” problem exists, however, the reason for the
persistence of excessive cost is evident: rulemakers are trying to cure
the symptoms rather than the disease. If the goal of heightened
pleading, limited discovery, and case management is to reduce costs,
heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Id. at 685.
8.
Amendments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1980, 1983, 1993, 2000, and 2006
were principally designed to accomplish the related aims of limiting discovery and enhancing
judicial power to manage litigation. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of
American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2014) (“Since 1980, the Federal Rules
have been amended numerous times: the scope of discovery was narrowed; numerical limits
restricted the amount of discovery; and new discovery conferences, pretrial conferences,
mandatory disclosures, and sanction rules encouraged closer judicial supervision of discovery.”).
In addition to the Supreme Court’s decisions on motions to dismiss, see supra notes 5–7 and
accompanying text, the Court’s decisions recognizing an expanded role for summary judgment, see,
e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986), also fit into the same mold.
9.
Although it is still early to measure the effect of Twombly and Iqbal, the preliminary
data do not reflect a significant change in federal practice. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE vii (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E32T-3UQW (noting that,
although the rate of filing motions to dismiss rose after Twombly and Iqbal, the rate at which
motions to dismiss were granted remained unchanged except in one narrow category of cases); JOE
S. CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND 5 (2011), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/24U6-EQ32 (confirming these findings, but noting
that the “findings do not rule out the possibility that the pleading standards established in
Twombly and Iqbal may have a greater effect in narrower categories of cases in which respondents
must obtain the facts from movants in order to state a claim”). Similarly, the 2000 amendment to
Rule 26, which was designed to curtail the discovery of information relevant to the “subject matter”
of a case, had minimal effect. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000
Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 25 (2001) (noting that
“plaintiffs have not been doing at all badly” despite the restriction).
10. For studies suggesting that the discovery process generally performs well and that its
difficulties are confined to a small subset of cases, see James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery
Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV.
613, 682 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practices Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998). But see
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 6–7 (describing surveys that suggest the cost of discovery is
disproportionately high, especially in small cases).
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then rulemakers should do so directly. They should limit the amount of
money that litigants can spend on a lawsuit.
The method for doing so is simple. Before the first case
conference, each party should submit a budget detailing the costs that
the party expects to incur in the case. After examining both budgets as
well as the nature of the case, the court should determine the amount
of money that each party can spend and enter an order requiring the
parties to stay within their budgets.11
This “litigation budget” approach may sound fanciful, but
British courts implemented it in 2013. 12 Because British courts
typically use the English (or loser-pays) rule, 13 the court has a stick with
which to enforce the parties’ compliance with its budget order: it will
generally award a winning party no more in fees and costs than the
amount approved in the budget. 14 Because American courts typically
employ the American rule, under which each party bears its own fees
and most of its own costs, 15 adapting the British approach to the
American system requires practical adjustments that raise practical,
political, and constitutional concerns.
This Article examines these issues. Part II sets out the nature of
the overspending problem that litigation budgeting seeks to solve. Part
III describes the British approach and adapts it to a system that could
effectively alter the incentives of American litigants to overspend. Part
IV responds to a series of objections to litigation budgets.
Litigation budgeting is simple, and it is radical. Some will argue
that it is an impermissible and unwise exercise of judicial power. The
ultimate questions that this Article poses are these: If direct control of

(d).

11.

Like other pretrial orders, the court can modify the order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4),

12. CPR 3.12–.18 (2014). In English practice these budgets are called “costs budgets.”
13. See CPR 44.2(2)(a) (“[T]he general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to
pay the costs of the successful party.”); see also CPR 44.2(1) (giving the court discretion whether
to award costs and what the amount of the award will be).
14. CPR 3.18 (2013) (“[W]hen assessing costs on the standard basis, the court will . . . not
depart from such approved or agreed budget unless satisfied that there is good reason to do so.”).
15. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (describing
the American rule). Winning parties can collect modest costs in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(2012). Despite the prevalence of the American rule, federal courts employ a loser-pays approach
in many circumstances. For a comprehensive list of federal fee-shifting provisions, see HENRY
COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS AND
FEDERAL AGENCIES 2–115 (2008) (describing approximately four hundred fee-shifting statutes, as
well as fee-shifting provisions at common law and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
The only American state generally to employ a loser-pays rule is Alaska. See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 09.60.010 (West 2014); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2013)
(permitting fee shifting in a range of civil matters); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 650–51 (2013) (discussing the general use of the
American rule in state courts).
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litigation costs by means of budgets is too radical, then are the indirect
methods of control adopted over the past thirty years also illegitimate?
Conversely, if directly controlling costs is not too radical, why not do so
rather than continuing to use indirect methods that have proven (at
best) marginally effective?
II. EXCESSIVE SPENDING ON LITIGATION
Finding a solution to excessive litigation costs begins with an
understanding of the reasons that parties spend too much. Excessive
spending can arise from two causes. First, the parties’ private
incentives to invest in litigation may diverge from the socially optimal
level of investment. Because the parties do not internalize all of the
costs of their litigation decisions, decisions to incur certain expenses
may be economically justified from a party’s viewpoint even if the total
of the litigation expenses incurred by all the parties is socially wasteful.
Second, the parties may make litigation investments that are not
economically rational—in other words, they cannot rationally expect
that their litigation investment will change the value of the case by an
amount greater than the money they expend, but they make the
investment anyway.
The following sections analyze these circumstances in detail.
They also demonstrate that the pleading and pretrial reforms of the
past thirty-plus years—as well as present reform proposals—are
destined to fail as mechanisms to control litigation costs because they
fail to address the causes of excessive spending.
Before undertaking this analysis, let me make the basic point
that underlies this Article: litigation should not cost more than the
benefit it provides to society. 16 To take a simple example, if the expected
16. This principle is most evidently grounded in the economic notion of Pareto superiority,
as modified by the Kaldor-Hicks principle. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
LAW 4–6 (2004) (discussing Pareto improvements and Pareto optimality and the Kaldor-Hicks, or
“potential Pareto superiority,” refinement). But the principle is also consonant with various
strands of moral theory. It is obviously supported by utilitarianism, under which actions that bring
the greatest good to the greatest number are morally preferable. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
Consequentialism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring
2014 ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consequentialism/,
archived at http://perma.cc/BAQ2-C6KT. But the principle can be justified by other moral
traditions. For instance, limiting litigation spending to a socially justified level can be derived from
Mill’s Harm Principle, which holds that one person’s liberty to act ends at the point at which the
person’s actions impose undue costs on others. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 30 (John Gray
& G.W. Smith ed., 1991) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will[ ] is to prevent harm to others.”). Mill derived
the Harm Principle from his utilitarian philosophy, but some have argued that “the Harm
Principle is more properly regarded as . . . based on Kant’s doctrine of right.” William E. O’Brian,
Jr., Distributive Justice and the Sovereignty Principle, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011).
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social value of a victim’s claim is $10,000, but it costs the victim, the
injurer, and the court $7,000 apiece to litigate the dispute, then
litigation is socially wasteful; it costs $21,000 to recover $10,000.
It is important to consider this question from the viewpoint of
social, rather than private, benefits and costs. 17 On the one side, the
social benefits of the victim’s lawsuit may include positive externalities
that exceed the $10,000 judgment received by the plaintiff. For
instance, the judgment may have a deterrent effect that keeps other
actors’ behavior in line. 18 Likewise, if the case involves uncertain law,
clarifying the law may have social benefits. 19 On the other side, the
social costs of litigation may exceed $21,000 due to negative
externalities associated with the lawsuit. For instance, the threat of
litigation may deter actors from engaging in socially useful behavior.
Regardless of what is thrown onto the “benefit” and “cost” sides of the
scale, the principle is simple: litigation whose social cost exceeds its
social benefit generally should be discouraged. 20
A. The Incentive to Engage in Privately Beneficial but Socially
Wasteful Litigation Practices
A principal cause of socially excessive spending on litigation is
the myopia of self-regarding litigants who are willing to spend money
Limiting litigation expenditures is also consistent with (albeit not required by) Rawls’s veil of
ignorance: people who do not know which position they will occupy in society (litigant willing to
spend excessively, litigant preferring not to spend excessively, judge, or citizen) would likely prefer
that costs be kept to a socially justified level. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971)
(positing a “difference principle” under which a society may legitimately maintain inequalities in
the distribution of basic social goods only if members of the society, operating from behind a veil
of ignorance, would all agree to the inequality).
17. In this Article, the term “social benefits” refers to the combined benefits that litigation
provides to the private individuals involved in the litigation and to society. When referring only to
the benefits to society, I use the term “public benefits.” Likewise, the term “social costs” includes
both the costs incurred by the litigants and the costs imposed on society. When referring only to
the costs to society, I use the term “public costs.”
18. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 585 (1997) (showing that “it may be socially
desirable for more to be spent on suit than the amount at stake” when a lawsuit “create[s]
substantial deterrence” that leads actors to take steps to reduce injuries by an amount that exceeds
the costs of the lawsuit).
19. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that a
judge’s “job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”).
20. Whether a legal system wishes to discourage certain forms of cost-effective litigation and
whether it wishes to permit certain forms of cost-ineffective litigation are political choices that do
not affect the general point. Even when a society encourages cost-prohibitive litigation for
historical or political reasons, it is better that the litigation is conducted as efficiently as possible.
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on litigation as long as it yields a net private gain—even though other
parties and the court must now respond with expenditures that create
a net social loss. Present and proposed reforms to pleading, discovery,
and pretrial do little to address this fundamental problem.
1. The Problem
Because many litigants consider only the benefits they garner
and the costs they incur, they consider neither the benefits of the
lawsuit that they do not capture nor the costs that their behavior
imposes on others. 21 In the first instance, when they fail to capture the
benefits of litigation, they may choose not to bring or defend a socially
valuable suit. 22 In the second instance, when litigants fail to regard the
costs that their actions impose on others, they may bring or defend a
suit that is socially costly. If the plaintiff stands to gain an expected
$10,000 at an expected cost of $7,000, the plaintiff will file suit even if
the lawsuit requires the defendant and the court also to spend $7,000
apiece. The fact that the case has a negative value (–$11,000) from
society’s viewpoint does not affect the plaintiff’s decision to bring suit
because the plaintiff does not bear the defendant’s and court’s costs. 23
Although private and social incentives to litigate may align (as they
would if the costs to both parties and the court were $3,000 apiece, and
the benefit was $10,000), in some cases they do not.
This hypothetical is a simplified example of the net-benefit
calculations in which parties actually engage. As Professors Grundfest
and Huang have shown, the parties invest in litigation in increments
rather than all at once 24—a fact that gives plaintiffs a surprising
21. Shavell, supra note 18, at 577–78.
22. Id. at 583–84. Creating incentives to engage in privately uneconomical but socially
beneficial litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
23. This hypothetical, which assumes that the expected $10,000 recovery is not only a social
benefit but also the only social benefit, involves a self-regarding plaintiff. The party making a
privately profitable but socially suboptimal litigation decision could also be a defendant. For
instance, a defendant rationally would choose to invest $5,000 in litigation expenses that could be
expected to reduce the claim by $6,000—even if the plaintiff and the court will expend an
additional $7,000 apiece in responding to the defendant’s investment.
24. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1293–98 (2006) (adapting real-option theory used in
determining whether to invest in a research-and-development project to the decision whether to
invest in litigation). Real-option analysis differs from traditional economic analysis, which
determines expected value by discounting the full value of a desired benefit by a constant discount
rate that reflects the risk of not obtaining that benefit. Real-options analysis recognizes that risk
levels can fluctuate as market conditions change and parties adapt to those changes. “While the
traditional . . . approaches assume a fixed commitment to full investment at the outset, real option
theory models the investment process as a series of decision points at which investors have the
option of adjusting their investments in response to new information.” Id. at 1273–74. At these
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incentive under some conditions to file suit in cases in which neither
they nor society expect a positive return. 25 For instance, if the plaintiff
seeking to recover on a claim with an expected value of $10,000 must
spend $14,000 in litigation expenses, it seems that the plaintiff will
choose not to bring suit. In some cases, however, the plaintiff will do so
because the plaintiff can abandon the suit without incurring all $14,000
in expenses. Suppose, for instance, that the plaintiff’s claim, if
successful, is worth $40,000 (but $0 if unsuccessful). The plaintiff’s
outlay for investigating and filing the complaint, and then responding
to a motion to dismiss the case, 26 is $7,000, and the likelihood of
surviving the pleading stage is fifty percent. If the case survives the
first stage, the plaintiff must now invest an additional $7,000, with the
two outcomes ($40,000 and $0) being equally likely. Overall, the
plaintiff has a twenty-five percent chance of winning the case, so the
claim has an expected value of $10,000. 27 In deciding whether to
commence the case, however, the plaintiff knows that she does not need
to commit all $14,000 at once. Instead, she can spend $7,000 in pursuit
of an asset valued at $10,000—a sensible economic proposition. If she
succeeds at the first stage, she now has a fifty-fifty chance to win
$40,000, so an expenditure of another $7,000 is also rational. 28
This result does not pertain across all situations; there are
points at which a plaintiff has no incentive to bring a negative-value
suit. 29 A decision to invest in negative-value litigation is most likely to
decision points an investor can continue to invest or to withdraw funding, depending on the
perceived risk of doing so at that moment. As Professors Grundfest and Huang show, this approach
has great salience in litigation; because parties do not invest money all at once but rather
incrementally over the course of the lawsuit, they can adjust their decisions about how much to
invest in the next step of the litigation process based on how well (or poorly) the litigation has gone
so far.
25. Id. at 1277, 1299–305 (explaining that a lawsuit with a negative expected value is
equivalent to an out-of-the-money call option that a plaintiff will rationally pursue as long as the
price of the option is low and the volatility of the claim’s value is high).
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (describing seven grounds on which a court may dismiss a
complaint).
27. I assume that the expenses for the defendant and the court for each stage are also $7,000
apiece, although (because the plaintiff does not bear these costs) their exact amount does not bear
on the plaintiff’s calculations. Throughout these examples I also assume the rationality and risk
neutrality of both parties.
28. By “rational” I mean that the plaintiff seeks to maximize her wealth at each stage of the
litigation process. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1275 (specifying that, in a real-options
model for litigation, the litigants are “identical, risk-neutral, individually rational agents who
share common knowledge about all of a lawsuit’s characteristics”). Thus, the plaintiff spends the
first $7,000 to pursue an asset worth, at that time, $10,000; she spends another $7,000 (or $14,000
in total) only when new information (success at the pleading stage) suggests a new value ($20,000)
for the claim.
29. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1282, 1302–04.
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occur when the variance in the value of the claim (in the sense that the
value can change significantly as it clears each stage) is great. 30 The
most important point about this analysis, however, is that it does not
alter—indeed, it fundamentally confirms and expands the application
of—the principle that private parties’ litigation incentives sometimes
diverge from the social ideal, resulting in the maintenance of socially
wasteful litigation. 31
The prior hypotheticals assumed that the only benefit of
litigation is the recovery provided in the judgment or settlement. In
some cases, however, litigation yields other private benefits, not all of
them legitimate from society’s viewpoint. Perhaps a lawsuit scares off
potential competitors 32 or allows a public-interest organization to
influence policy or generate contributions. 33 Despite the social costs
involved, its private benefits can provide an incentive to litigate.
Although each rule affects the circumstances under which
parties will engage in privately beneficial but socially wasteful
litigation, neither the American nor the English rule for payment of
attorney’s fees eliminates the incentive to do so. 34 To illustrate, take the
prior negative-value hypothetical, in which the plaintiff will rationally
choose to invest $7,000 initially and another $7,000 should she survive
the motion to dismiss, in a $40,000 case with a fifty-fifty chance of
prevailing at each stage. Assume further that the defendant can be
expected to spend $5,000 in defending the first stage (through the
motion to dismiss) and $10,000 in the second stage (from pretrial
through trial). 35 Costs to the court through the motion-to-dismiss stage

30. Id. at 1277. The traditional present-value approach used to calculate whether (and to
what extent) the parties will file and defend suits, see supra text following note 22, is simply a
special case of this real-option analysis—a case in which the value of the claim varies little as the
parties develop new information. Id. at 1295.
31. Id. at 1320 (“[U]ncertainty alone can be sufficient to throw a monkey wrench into the
proposition that private litigation can systematically be relied upon to achieve optimal social
objectives even in a risk-neutral world.”).
32. Cf. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (D. Md. 1998)
(noting that the plaintiff “had publicly stated its policy to use patent infringement litigation to
prevent generic competitors from marketing [competing] products”).
33. Cf. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 203 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing in banc) (“[T]he only purpose of this litigation is for counsel and their
plaintiffs to act out their fantasy of persecution, to validate their pretensions to policy expertise,
to make themselves consequential rather than marginal, and to raise funds for self-sustaining
litigation.”).
34. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1325–26 (briefly discussing the relevance of
real-option analysis in determining the better fee-shifting rule).
35. This disparity between plaintiff and defendant might seem anomalous, but defense
expenditures often exceed those of the plaintiff. See JAMES A. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE,
RAND, THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION vii–viii
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are an expected $2,000, with another $4,000 in expected costs for the
second stage. Thus, total costs through the first stage of litigation are
$14,000 ($7,000 plaintiff + $5,000 defendant + $2,000 judicial) for a case
with an expected value at that point of $10,000. Total costs for the
second stage of the litigation are $21,000 ($7,000 plaintiff + $10,000
defendant + $4,000 judicial) for a case with an expected value at that
point of $20,000. 36 Unless the lawsuit yields other benefits that exceed
the net loss, 37 society would prefer that the case not be filed.
Under either the American or the English rule, however, the
case will be filed. Under the American rule, the plaintiff has an
incentive to file suit for the reason that I have explained. The plaintiff
does not bear the costs of the defense or the court. Because her own
costs are less that her expected recovery at both the first and the second
stages of the suit, she will file suit and continue to prosecute it if she
clears the motion-to-dismiss hurdle.
Under the English rule, the plaintiff will bear both parties’ costs
if she loses but neither party’s costs if she wins; like the American rule,
however, she does not pay the costs of the court, so she can ignore them.
At the first stage of the litigation, the total costs of the parties are
$12,000. The plaintiff has a fifty percent chance of immediately paying
these costs. Because her risk of paying first-stage costs ($6,000) is less
than her present expected recovery ($10,000), she will file suit. 38 At the
(1986) (reporting that defense litigation expenditures in tort cases were $8 to $10 billion, and
plaintiffs’ expenditures were $6 to $8 billion).
36. Although stylized to demonstrate the problem, the numbers used in the example are
hardly outlandish. One study found that it cost fifty-four cents to deliver forty-six cents of
compensation to tort victims. Id. at iii. In asbestos cases, that figure rose to sixty-three cents to
deliver thirty-seven cents of compensation. JAMES A. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, THE INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 40 (1983); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1469–70 (2010) (reviewing data
suggesting that in tort cases roughly one dollar in litigation expenses is incurred for every dollar
received by plaintiffs). Although these data often do not factor in the deterrence benefits of these
suits, the costs to the judicial system to resolve the cases, the costs of administering insurance
payments, or the costs associated with discouraging lawful behavior, they provide some support
for the insight that private incentives to litigate under the American rule can, in some cases, cause
parties to engage in litigation in which social costs exceed social benefits. For a general discussion,
see Shavell, supra note 18, at 581–86.
37. Cf. Shavell, supra note 18, at 582–83 (discussing situations in which a lawsuit creates
no deterrence benefit). Professor Shavell would go farther and argues that compensation paid to a
victim is not generally a social benefit. Id. at 594–95. On this view, deterrence and other benefits,
net of costs such as the deterrence of socially useful behavior, must be even greater to justify the
lawsuit.
38. The plaintiff also has a chance of paying these costs if she loses at the second stage. I
account for this possibility in the text following this note, but another way that the plaintiff might
consider the issue is to recognize that there is, overall, a seventy-five percent chance that she will
pay $12,000 in first-stage costs (or $9,000). Because her expected recovery of $10,000 is still
greater, she will file suit.
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second stage, the total costs to the parties are $17,000, which the
plaintiff has a fifty percent chance of paying, for an expected cost of
$8,500. In addition, she still has a fifty percent chance of paying the
$12,000 in first-stage costs, or $6,000. Added together, the plaintiff’s
expected second-stage costs are $14,500, less than the $20,000 expected
recovery at the second stage. Hence, the plaintiff will file suit if costs
are distributed under the English rule.
Of course, the incentives are not identical under the two
systems. 39 Generally speaking, as the risk of losing and the amount of
the defense expenditures rise, the English rule creates a greater
disincentive for plaintiffs to file suit. For instance, if the defendant were
to spend $8,000 in first-stage litigation costs and the plaintiff’s chance
of moving past that stage were forty percent, the case would no longer
be worth filing under the English rule, although it would remain a
viable proposition under the American rule. 40 On the other hand, as a
general matter the English rule creates a greater incentive for plaintiffs
to file suit and spend money on the litigation as the likelihood of the
plaintiff’s success rises. When the plaintiff is very likely to recover her
costs, she has a limited incentive to keep them under control. 41 For
instance, if the chance that the plaintiff will navigate each stage
successfully rises to seventy-five percent and if the defendant’s costs of
defense remain constant, then the plaintiff has an incentive to spend as
much as an extravagant $84,999 at the first stage of the litigation and
another $20,000 at the second stage. 42 In cases in which the plaintiff
39. See generally Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and Legal Evolution: Does
Procedure Matter?, 152 PUB. CHOICE 181, 182–83 (2012) (creating an economic model to analyze
the American-rule and English-rule incentives to litigate under varying conditions of uncertainty
over the outcome).
40. With the reduction of the first-stage risk to forty percent, the value of the claim at the
first stage falls to an expected $8,000. Under the American rule, the plaintiff’s expenditure of
$7,000 in first-stage claims remains less than the expected value of the case, so the plaintiff will
file suit. Under the English rule, however, the plaintiff bears a sixty percent risk of paying $15,000
in costs (an expected $9,000), making the claim no longer worth filing.
41. The converse is true when the plaintiff has a weak claim: the defendant then has a
limited incentive to keep his costs under control.
42. At the first stage, the expected recovery is $22,500 ($40,000 discounted by a twenty-five
percent chance of losing the first stage and another twenty-five percent chance of losing the second
stage). At the first stage, therefore, the plaintiff has an incentive to spend as much as $22,499 on
the case. Given that the defendant’s expenditure is $5,000 and the plaintiff bears only a twentyfive percent chance of bearing both that cost as well as her own, she can spend $84,999 on the first
stage and still be money ahead ($22,500 > .25 × ($84,999 + $5,000)). At the second stage, she now
has a seventy-five percent chance of winning $40,000. Given that the defendant’s expenditures at
the second stage are $10,000 and that the plaintiff bears a twenty-five percent chance of losing the
second stage, the plaintiff has a twenty-five percent chance of paying the defendant’s expenditures
of $15,000 plus her own. If she expended the maximum $84,999 at the first stage, she can still
spend another $20,000 at the second stage (.75 × $40,000 > .25 × ($15,000 + $84,999 + $20,000)).
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has a strong claim, the English rule provides incentives to pursue
socially wasteful litigation that are more perverse than the American
rule. 43
Until now, I have assumed that each party acts with indifference
to the costs that its litigation conduct imposes on other parties. In some
cases, however, parties may engage in socially wasteful litigation
practices precisely to impose costs. Four scenarios are most common. In
the first, a particular case may be similar to other cases, and the
defendant spends a vast amount of money on the case—spending, say,
$1 million on a case worth $500,000—to discourage later litigants from
filing suit. This type of “scorched earth” tactic can be entirely rational
from the defendant’s standpoint if it discourages potential plaintiffs
from bringing similar claims in the future. 44
In the second scenario, one party engages in litigation tactics
designed to create leverage. Assume that the plaintiff’s expected
recovery is $10,000 and the costs to the plaintiff, the defendant, and the
court of resolving the case are $7,000 apiece. Under the American rule,
before expenses are incurred, the case should settle for something
between $3,000 and $17,000, 45 with a midpoint of $10,000. Now suppose
that the plaintiff is entitled to discover relevant information that would
add no value to the case but would cost the defendant $8,000 to provide.
The plaintiff might rationally request this discovery and then seek to
settle the case for a higher figure than she could have obtained before.
Because the defendant’s cost of litigation has now risen to $25,000, the
plaintiff has pushed up the midpoint settlement up to $14,000. This
type of “impositional discovery,” in which either a plaintiff seeks to
extort a higher settlement or a defendant seeks to extort a lower
If the plaintiff spends less than $84,999 on the first stage, she can spend more on the second stage,
as long as the amounts spent on both stages is less than $105,000.
43. Cf. Shavell, supra note 18, at 587–88 (noting that “fee-shifting would tend to worsen any
problem of excessive suit”).
44. This tactic has sometimes been associated with tobacco companies engaged in productliability litigation. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 857–58 (1992) (describing the tobacco companies’ “no-compromise strategy,” in
which “they would, as a first line of defense, spare no cost in exhausting their adversaries’
resources short of the courthouse door,” as a reaction to “the size of the . . . financial stakes” if they
began to settle claims). The difference in investment incentives between the sole plaintiff and the
repeat-player defendant is an argument for aggregating related claims into one suit, thus
equalizing incentives of plaintiffs and defendants. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (2002). I assume
that this aggregation has not occurred.
45. The plaintiff will not consider any offer less than $3,000 because she can expect a net
recovery of $3,000 ($10,000 expected gross recovery less $7,000 in expected costs). The defendant
will not make an offer greater than $17,000 because the most it expects to pay after trial is a
$10,000 judgment plus $7,000 in costs.
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settlement (or dismissal), is a classic form of discovery abuse. 46 It is not
clear how often impositional discovery actually occurs, 47 but in theory
parties might rationally act in this manner. Whatever its prevalence,
impositional discovery remains a bogeyman of civil procedure; a
number of recent reforms have been designed to stamp it out. 48
Two other scenarios are the converse of impositional discovery:
they are impositional responses to discovery. First, a party may
“stonewall,” refusing to provide information responsive to legitimate
discovery requests. 49 The nonresponding party hopes that the cost to
the requesting party of obtaining the information is so great that the
requesting party will either abandon the request or cut it back. Being
obstreperous is costly, but it is a worthwhile strategy if the value of the
information shielded from discovery would have altered the value of the
claim by more than the cost of stonewalling. 50
Another impositional response strategy is the “document
dump.” 51 Under this approach, a responding party buries the requesting
46. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)
(“[I]mpositional requests may inflict on the responding party costs substantially greater than the
social value of the information.”); John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 582 (1989)
(“ ‘Impositional benefits’ . . are those benefits that the requesting party expects to gain because her
request imposes costs upon the answering party.”).
47. See Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear’s The
Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REV. 649, 649–51 (1989) (describing five forms of discovery
abuse and suggesting that impositional discovery is “the least important”; further noting the views
of several magistrate judges that impositional discovery abuse is “not an appreciable problem” and
is “rare”).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983 Amendment) (stating that the new
proportionality rule should be used “in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of discovery
to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or affluent”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note (2000 Amendment) (noting that time limits on
depositions were necessary because “overlong depositions can result in undue costs and delays”);
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 3–4 (stating that the proposed reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are “a package of integrated measures that would work toward [the] goals” of
“cooperation, proportionality, and active case management”).
49. See, e.g., MAZ Partners v. PHC, Inc. (In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig.), 762 F.3d 138, 145
(1st Cir. 2014) (declining to permit entry of summary judgment until the plaintiff had a fair
opportunity to obtain discovery; “[t]o rule otherwise would encourage defendants to ‘stonewall’
during discovery—withholding or covering up key information that is otherwise available to them
through the exercise of reasonable diligence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 7 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010%20report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2625-CQP4 (“[P]laintiffside lawyers reported practices such as ‘stonewalling’ . . . accompanied by long delays, overly
narrow interpretations of discovery requests, and motions that require expensive responses from
opposing parties and that create delay while the court rules.”).
51. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Lamonte, 366 F. App’x 736, 738–739 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding
sanction of contempt when a defendant ultimately produced “an unorganized ‘document dump’ ”
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party in a blizzard of information that is costly to process and digest.
Dumping creates some costs for the responding party, but if dumping
swamps the requesting party and forces that party to expend its limited
resources on sorting through largely irrelevant material (rather than
on conducting other discovery that might be detrimental to the
responding party), the strategy can be worthwhile.
2. The Ineffectiveness of Reforms in Addressing the Problem
Despite their intention to the contrary, recent and proposed
reforms to pleading, discovery, and pretrial do little to alter privately
rational but socially undesirable incentives to litigate. Raising the
pleading bar, as the Supreme Court has done, 52 has two effects. First,
it screens out cases in which the plaintiff’s limited access to information
makes it impossible for the plaintiff to meet the plausibility standard,
resulting in either dismissal of a filed claim or a decision to forgo filing
a claim. 53 Second, it increases the cost of the pleading process in cases
in which the plaintiff has access to sufficient information. In the second
situation, the additional cost may induce plaintiffs whose cases already
hover near the break-even point not to sue, but this cost likely has an
impact on only a few cases at the margin.
In neither instance is heightened pleading targeted toward cases
in which the parties have an incentive to expend a socially excessive
of mostly irrelevant material); Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2014) (“Litigants began ‘document dumping’—flooding opponents with
unmanageable datasets to increase costs and decrease their chances of finding key documents.”).
52. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. The Court has not retreated from this
standard. See Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2471 (2014) (suggesting that, in
light of the fiduciaries’ legal obligations, plaintiff employees may have difficulty pleading plausible
claims against the fiduciaries of an employee stock ownership plan who continued to invest in the
company despite the allegedly overvalued price of its stock; remanding to the court of appeals to
apply the “prudent person” standard); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 n.5 (2014) (reiterating
Iqbal’s instruction that “courts ‘must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true,’
but ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ ” in a case
involving the qualified immunity of Secret Service agents (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009))); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6
(2014) (stating that, “like any other element of a cause of action, [proximate cause] must be
adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case to proceed” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678–79)). The pending amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also propose to
abrogate Rule 84 and the official forms promulgated under it. See Memorandum, supra note 2, at
2. Given the tension between the minimalist forms and the new pleading standard, see Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575–76 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting), this abrogation can be
viewed as part of the effort to require more detailed pleadings.
53. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2331–32 (2012) (using an economic
model to estimate that Twombly and Iqbal have had, at a minimum, a negative effect in fifteen
percent to twenty-one percent of cases).
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amount of money on litigation. Heightened pleading may screen out
some cases in which parties have such an incentive, but it may also
screen out cases that are socially desirable to litigate. Likewise, in cases
in which plaintiffs are willing to incur the greater pleading expense and
still file suit, raising the pleading bar is only worth the additional cost
of pleading if it reduces subsequent litigation expenses by more than
the cost of pleading—for instance, by reducing the number of
unsuccessful motions to dismiss that courts must decide or by clarifying
the scope of discovery—but not otherwise.
Indeed, real-option analysis shows that increasing the pleading
bar may sometimes induce parties to file negative-value suits that they
would not have filed with a lower pleading bar. Consider a case in which
there are only two stages: a pleading stage and pretrial-and-trial stage.
The full value of the plaintiff’s claim is $26,000. Should the case reach
the pretrial-and-trial stage, the chances of recovery are fifty percent.
Further assume that no pleading bar exists, 54 that the plaintiff’s
expected costs are $7,000 for the pleading stage and $7,000 for the
pretrial-and-trial stage, that the defendant’s costs are the same, and
that the court’s costs are $1,000 for both stages combined. Because the
plaintiff has an expected recovery of $13,000 and expected costs of
$14,000, the plaintiff will not file suit under either the American or the
English rule. This result matches up with society’s desired outcome.
Assuming no other social benefits or costs from the litigation had the
lawsuit proceeded, it would have cost $29,000 to redeem a $26,000
asset.
On the other hand, assume that the pleading stage contains a
motion to dismiss, on which the plaintiff stands an eighty percent
chance of prevailing. If she clears this hurdle, she then stands a sixty
percent chance of prevailing at trial. 55 Because of the extra costs of the
motion, the plaintiff and the defendant can both expect to spend $9,000
at the pleading stage, and the court will spend an extra $1,000 to
resolve the motion; pretrial-and-trial costs for the parties and the court
remain constant. Under the American rule the plaintiff will invest
$9,000 in initial pleading-stage costs because the value of the claim at
this point is $12,480 ($26,000 × .8 × .6). If she clears the motion-to54. Without a pleading bar, the plaintiff has a one hundred percent chance of reaching the
pretrial-and-trial stage. Therefore, the parties and the court will incur all of the expenses during
both the pleading stage and the pretrial-and-trial stage.
55. For instance, the case may involve both a legal question and a factual question. The legal
question is one that could be answered on a motion to dismiss, and the existing precedents on the
issue strongly favor the plaintiff, giving her an eighty percent chance of prevailing on the motion.
After clearing this hurdle, the plaintiff must still prove the case, and the facts, while generally
favoring the plaintiff, give her a sixty percent chance of success at trial.
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dismiss hurdle, she will then spend the next $7,000 in pretrial-and-trial
costs because her expected recovery at that point is $15,600 ($26,000 ×
.6). 56 From a social viewpoint, however, the case—with a potential
recovery of $26,000 at a cost to the parties and court of $34,000 57—
should not be filed.
By creating a first-stage hurdle that allows a plaintiff to forgo
some litigation expenses if the case is unsuccessful, heightened
pleading can counterintuitively induce more litigation. Whether it does
so in a particular case depends on the odds of prevailing and the
expected costs and recovery of that case. To the extent that the goal is
to reduce socially wasteful litigation, however, raising the pleading bar
is not an unadulterated solution.
The same difficulty infects most of the other procedural reforms.
In particular, reforms designed to limit the scope of discovery or the
frequency with which discovery devices can be used 58 do not limit the
amount of money that parties can spend on litigation. All they may do
is funnel the parties’ expenditures into the remaining permissible
channels of discovery.
For instance, one of the present reform proposals eliminates the
capacity of parties to obtain information relevant to the “subject matter”
of the case, instead limiting parties to the discovery of information
relevant to existing claims and defenses. 59 It is not clear how much
“subject matter” discovery occurs or how much its elimination will save.
In any event, this proposal is unlikely to have much effect on reducing
the cost of litigation. One reason is the discovering party’s ability to
characterize a request that sits on the borderline between “claim or
defense” and “subject matter” discovery as the former. 60 A more
substantial reason is that parties denied one avenue of discovery may
invest their money in other discovery or litigation expenditures.
Assume that it makes sense for a party to limit discovery expenditures
to $20,000. The cost to obtain essential discovery is $18,000, leaving
56. The plaintiff would also file suit under the English rule. In deciding whether to file suit,
she would realize that, if she cleared the first stage, she would have a sixty percent chance of
recovering $26,000 (or $15,600), compared to a forty percent chance of paying the parties’ combined
$32,000 in costs (or $12,800).
57. The parties will expend $16,000 apiece (or $32,000 in total), and the court $2,000.
58. See supra notes 2, 8, and accompanying text.
59. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting a court to order “subject matter” discovery
on a showing of “good cause”), with Memorandum, supra note 2, at 20 (recommending the
elimination of “subject matter” discovery).
60. Cf. In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1190–93 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying a
writ of mandamus to prevent discovery of the design and failure rates of tires similar to the tire
involved in the lawsuit because the discovery was relevant to the plaintiffs’ “broad theory” of
liability and was therefore not “subject matter” discovery).

872

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:855

another $2,000 to invest at its discretion. If a $2,000 investment in
subject matter discovery would yield an expected $4,000 change in the
value of the case, the party will invest in that discovery as long as no
other litigation (or other) investment promises a greater return. But if
subject matter discovery is curtailed, the party will not necessarily put
that $2,000 back in its pocket. The party will look to see if there are
other litigation expenditures that will change the value of the case by
more than the party could make by investing the $2,000 on
nonlitigation items. Perhaps a $2,000 investment in a better expert or
a better lawyer will yield an expected gain of $3,500, or perhaps
additional legal research will result in an expected increase of $3,000.
In short, curtailing “subject matter” discovery does not guarantee a
reduction in the overall amount that parties spend on litigation. It is
most likely to have an effect in cases involving scorched-earth tactics or
impositional discovery, for the simple reason that it limits the subjects
of inquiry that proponents of these tactics can pursue. But, even here,
the party bent on imposing costs on an opponent can often channel the
money that would have gone into subject-matter discovery into other
forms of case-relevant discovery, or into more experts or lawyers.
The same is true of other reforms that curtail discovery. For
example, limiting the parties’ resort to discovery devices such as
depositions or interrogatories—limitations implemented in prior waves
of discovery reform61—will shift discovery expenses away from these
techniques but cannot guarantee that the parties’ overall litigation
expenses will be less.
In addition, limiting investment options in litigation may rob
society of some of the value of the litigation. A party will not invest
$2,000 in subject-matter discovery unless that expenditure can be
expected to yield more benefit than other possible expenditures. If we
assume that this benefit is a change in case value of $4,000, and if the
next-best expenditure yields a change in case value of $3,500, then
society has lost $500 by denying subject-matter discovery. 62
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (limiting the number of depositions to ten per side), FED.
R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (limiting the duration of a deposition to one day of seven hours), FED. R. CIV. P.
33(a)(1) (limiting the number of interrogatories to twenty-five). A proposal to further limit resort
to certain discovery devices did not make the final cut of the pending amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 2.
62. I assume that the costs to the other party and the court of responding to this “subject
matter” discovery, after considering the costs of responding to the next-best discovery tactic, are
less than $500. If not, then precluding the “subject matter” discovery is appropriate. In addition,
real-option analysis shows that increasing the variance in claim value (which a potential $4,000
change in claim value does more than a potential $3,500 change in claim value) also increases the
willingness of parties to litigate low-value claims—a result that may be socially undesirable.
Likewise, “subject matter” discovery might be properly objectionable because it is used only to
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In a similar way, case-management techniques, which have
continued to expand since their deployment in 1983, can have only a
modest effect on the parties’ litigation incentives. 63 For the most part,
the judge’s case-management tools allow a judge to restrict discovery
either directly (by limiting the amount or subjects of discovery) 64 or
indirectly (by imposing deadlines that make extended discovery
impossible or attempting to get the parties to abandon or stipulate to
certain issues). 65 We have seen the problem of direct methods. 66 With
respect to indirect means, powers such as the ability to streamline the
case by striking out issues in theory could rein in socially excessive
spending on litigation. In reality, however, a judge cannot prevent the
parties from channeling their resources into remaining claims and
defenses. More important, the managerial judge has no roving
authority to strike issues from a case. The judge can do so only if a claim
or defense fails to meet the stringent legal standards for Rule 12
motions to dismiss 67 or Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. 68 As
we have seen, the pleading standard does not necessarily reduce costs. 69
Moreover, motions for summary judgment, which usually occur “after
adequate time for discovery,” 70 cannot avoid many litigation costs
either.
The case-management power that might have the greatest effect
in heading off unnecessary expense—the judge’s ability to urge the use
impose costs on another party, a subject considered supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. A
flat rule barring “subject matter” discovery fails to capture these fine-grained decisions about case
value, costs, and party behavior.
63. Developed principally as an ad hoc response to the problem of complex litigation, see
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377–78 (1982), case management moved
into the mainstream of American litigation with the substantial reconstruction of Rule 16 in 1983
and its further expansion in 1993, 2000, and 2006. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note
(1983 Amendment) (“The amended rule makes scheduling and case management an express goal
of pretrial procedure.”); Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60
DUKE L.J. 669, 674–84 (2010) (chronicling the growth of case management in the Federal Rules).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F), (O); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note
(1993 Amendment) (“[A] major objective of pretrial conferences should be to consider appropriate
controls on the extent and timing of discovery.”).
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A), (c)(2)(A)–(E).
66. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (authorizing summary judgment when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (linking this standard to Rule 50(a)’s
“reasonable jury” standard for granting judgment as a matter of law). See generally JAY TIDMARSH
& ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 848–64 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the
authorities under which judges can adjudicate factual disputes).
69. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
70. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) techniques or to facilitate
settlement 71—is weak: the court cannot force parties either to make or
to accept a settlement offer, its power to force participation in ADR
methods has limits, and it cannot force a party to accept the outcome of
nonbinding ADR. 72 In any event, the data on the use of ADR are not
encouraging. ADR turns out to be a wash, saving time and money when
it works but costing time and money when it does not. 73 The same
verdict applies to nearly all case-management methods: with a couple
of exceptions, case management reduces costs in some cases and
increases them in others, with the net effect on costs being negligible.74
Therefore, in many cases, recent and proposed reforms in
pleading, discovery, and pretrial will not have their intended effect of
reducing costs. In some cases, they may have the opposite effect of
spurring socially wasteful litigation practices.
The one exception is the requirement of proportionality. The
principle that discovery be proportional to the needs of a case was
introduced as a one-sentence amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) in 1983. 75
Proportionality has had a peripatetic existence ever since, moving into
the newly created Rule 26(b)(2) in 1993, 76 splitting itself between Rule

71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I) (authorizing a court to take measures regarding “settling
the case and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute
or local rule”).
72. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson Cnty., Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a district court does not possess inherent power to compel participation in a mandatory summary
jury trial); In re Selby, 481 B.R. 90, 104 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2012) (“The Court cannot force a party
to accept a settlement offer it does not wish to accept, nor to make counteroffers.”). But see FED. R.
CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendment) (stating that statutes and local rules may
provide the authority to use “alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials,
mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration”; further noting that the present Rule
16(c)(2)(I) “does not attempt to resolve questions as to the extent a court would be authorized to
require such proceedings as an exercise of its inherent powers”).
73. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 71–76 (1996); JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 52–53, 63–65 (1996) [hereinafter
KAKALIK ET AL., MEDIATION].
74. See KAKALIK ET AL., MEDIATION, supra note 73, at xxx–xxxv (reporting data that savings
from the successful use of ADR in some cases were evenly balanced against the cost and delay from
the unsuccessful use of ADR in other cases); id. at xxx (describing similar inconclusive results in
prior investigations of court-annexed arbitration programs).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1983) (limiting discovery when it is cumulative or
duplicative, when a party had ample prior opportunity to discover the information, or when “the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation”).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (1993).
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26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(2) in 2000, 77 and then expanding into the newly
drafted e-discovery amendment of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) in 2006. 78 The
pending reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure move
proportionality back up to Rule 26(b)(1) and give it more emphasis. 79
These changes in location reflect proportionality’s increasingly central
role in civil litigation and have been designed to ensure that judges and
parties pay the principle adequate heed. 80 The principle itself has
remained constant from the outset.
Ensuring that litigation activities are worth their price is
precisely the right way to prevent socially wasteful spending. That said,
Rule 26 proportionality has drawbacks. First, despite the efforts of
rulemakers to emphasize proportionality, parties and courts often have
insufficient information to determine accurately whether a particular
line of discovery is worth its cost; they are unlikely to know what the
cost of the proposed discovery will be, how the evidence proposed to be
discovered will affect the value of the case, or what other social benefits
and costs flow from the plaintiff’s success or failure. 81 Without a ready
means of implementation, parties and courts sometimes fail to give
proportionality its due. 82
Second, Rule 26 proportionality is a conglomeration of factors.
In deciding whether “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit,” a court considers “the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
77. The proportionality rule remained in Rule 26(b)(2), but a sentence was added to Rule
26(b)(1) calling attention to it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (“All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”).
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (2006) and FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note
(“The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) is designed to address issues raised by difficulties in locating,
retrieving, and providing discovery of some electronically stored information.”).
79. The present draft of proposed Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 20.
80. See id. at 4–8 (“The cost-benefit factors included in present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) are
moved up to become part of the scope of discovery, identifying elements to be considered in
determining whether requested discovery is proportional to the needs of the case.”).
81. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d
ed. 2010) (noting that “the proportionality concept . . . seemed to require great familiarity with the
case,” thus stymying its implementation to a degree).
82. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 171 (D. Md. 2001)
(noting that, “[d]espite the obvious utility of the [proportionality] factors in tailoring discovery,”
they “have tended largely to be ignored by litigants, and, less frequently than desirable, used by
the courts”).
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issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.” 83 No particular weight is given to any factor. Such
open-ended, multi-factor tests breed uncertainty and are subject to
manipulation. 84
Third, the Rule 26 proportionality factors contain an ambiguity:
whether the court should analyze the issue from the viewpoint of the
litigants or from the viewpoint of society. 85 As we have seen, the two
viewpoints are not the same.
Fourth, proportionality works better as a response to excessively
costly discovery and pretrial activities—such as scorched-earth tactics
or impositional discovery—than to excessively costly responses to
discovery—such as stonewalling and document dumps. In theory the
same principle of proportionality applies to discovery and discovery
responses. But in reality it is difficult to enforce a principle that
requires responding parties to provide neither too little information nor
too much.
A final difficulty with the present proportionality principle is
that it applies only to discovery, not to the full range of pleading and
pretrial matters. Because discovery accounts for a substantial share of
all litigation expenses—as much as half according to one estimate 86—
keeping discovery costs proportional is important. But there is no
comparable means by which the court can keep the parties’ decisions
regarding pleading, motions, and other litigation conduct in balance. 87

83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
84. Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s congruence-and-proportionality standard because “such malleable
standards as ‘proportionality,’ . . . have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of
individual judges’ policy preferences”).
85. The Advisory Committee that first adopted a proportionality rule believed that
proportionality required consideration of the larger social benefits of litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26 advisory committee’s note (1983 Amendment) (noting that a court should consider “the
significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms”;
further noting that “many cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free
speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.”).
Courts received no direction, however, for applying proportionality when the private benefit of
litigation exceeded its public benefit.
86. See Willging et al., supra note 10, at 531 (describing sample results in which, of the
$13,000 spent on litigation expenses in the median case, “about half” went to discovery). See also
Kakalik et al., supra note 10, at 637 (estimating that an average of thirty-six percent of attorney
time and a median of twenty-five percent of discovery time was spent on discovery and discovery
motions).
87. In some cases courts can sanction parties for filing frivolous pleadings and motions. See
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c), 37(a). But not all socially suboptimal litigation is
frivolous litigation; as we have seen, rational litigation conduct may be socially suboptimal. See
supra Part I.A.1.
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In short, the reforms that have been adopted and the reform
proposals presently on the table do not provide courts with tools that
are likely to alter the parties’ rational but socially suboptimal behavior
in many cases. Indeed, some of the reforms may exacerbate this
behavior.
B. The Incentive to Engage in Privately and Socially Wasteful
Litigation Practices
In some instances, parties make litigation decisions that are
beneficial neither to themselves nor to society. The reforms to pleading,
discovery, and pretrial also do little to address this cause of excessive
spending.
1. The Problem
The situations in which parties invest more in litigation than
they can expect to gain in return are varied. The first involves a
nonneutral attitude toward risk. In the previous section, the analysis
assumed that the parties were risk-neutral; they regarded a fifty
percent chance of gaining $40,000 as equivalent to a sure $20,000. But
a plaintiff may be a risk-taker, or a defendant a risk-avoider. 88 In either
case, the party might prefer to spend more on discovery because of the
hope (in the plaintiff’s case) or the fear (in the defendant’s case) of a
larger judgment than risk-neutral parties expect.
Second, and relatedly, imperfect information may make a
plaintiff unduly optimistic or a defendant unduly pessimistic about the
likelihood of recovery, the amount of the recovery, or both. 89 For
instance, if an optimistic plaintiff believes that she has a sixty percent
chance of recovering $50,000 (even though, objectively, she has a fifty
percent chance of recovering $40,000), she would be willing to spend as
much as $30,000 on the case when a rational party would spend no more
than $20,000. The same is true for the pessimistic defendant who
88. These attitudes toward risk will not be present in every case; plaintiffs are often risk
averse, and defendants may be risk averse to risk neutral. See Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
Third-Party Financed Litigation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 701, 708 (2012) (“In many real-world
settings, the victim and the injurer will be risk averse.”); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:
Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1408–16 (2003) (reviewing literature
suggesting that plaintiffs are often risk averse but defendants may sometimes be risk neutral in
large-scale litigation).
89. Cf. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 444–50 (1994) (noting that one cost of discovery is the error in parties’
decisionmaking attributable to the discovery of information that makes them unduly optimistic or
pessimistic about their likelihood of success at trial).
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believes that his chances of prevailing are forty percent and the
judgment will be $50,000.
Imperfect information may also lead parties to make litigation
decisions that seem rational initially but turn out to be costly. Assume,
for instance, that a case has an expected value of $10,000, and the
plaintiff can seek discovery that costs $300 but will increase the case
value by $500. It seems rational to do so. But the defendant may seek
to counteract this new evidence with other evidence that undercuts its
value; for instance, assume that the cost of the defendant’s response to
the discovery request is $300, but the defendant can, at a cost of an
additional $100, obtain evidence to impeach this discovery and reduce
its value to the plaintiff to $50. Each individual move in this discovery
game is rational (the plaintiff spends $300 to gain $500, and the
defendant spends $400 to reduce liability by $450). Taking the long
view, however, the plaintiff has spent $300 and the defendant $450 to
improve the value of the claim by $50. The plaintiff’s inability to know
the full consequences of her actions can lead her to make a decision that
she might not have made had she been better informed. 90
Fourth, a party may spend excessively “for the principle of the
thing.” The party may be rich and very mad, or may be a public-interest
organization dedicated to advancing a particular point of view. In any
event, the economic benefit that the party derives from the suit is less
than the money that the party is willing to put into it.
Fifth, the parties may expend money to recover sunk litigation
costs. If a party has already expended $10,000 in litigation costs, the
party’s decision to spend the next $1,000 should hinge on whether the
party can expect at least a $1,000 favorable change in the value of the
claim; the $10,000 that has already been sunk into the litigation should
not factor into this decision. But human beings often try to recover sunk
costs and consequently make poor investment decisions. 91 Thus, a party
might choose to spend $1,000 in additional litigation expenses in order
to effect a $500 change in outcome, on the theory that enhancements in
the outcome make it more likely that the party will recoup the sunk
costs.
90. This expenditure is excessive even if it is rational in absolute terms. If the plaintiff in
this hypothetical stood to gain $5,000 net of costs, the expenditure of $300 to improve the claim
value by $50 does not turn the case into a negative-value claim; the plaintiff still expects to realize
a net gain of $4,750. Rather, the expenditure is irrational when viewed in marginal terms: the
next dollar spent on litigation does not yield at least another dollar in added claim value.
91. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113 (1990) (“Although economists exhort decision-makers to ignore
sunk costs and to attend only to the prospective benefits and costs of alternative courses of action,
few attain this ideal. Instead, individuals often incur further losses (‘throw good money after bad’)
or take great risks in order to recover those losses.”).
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Each of these last five situations involves behavior in which a
party acts under conditions of imperfect information or otherwise fails
to act as homo economicus would. A sixth situation is different: it
involves the problem of agency costs. Agency costs arise when: (1) the
act that maximizes the agent’s rational self-interest is not the act that
maximizes the wealth of the agent’s principal; (2) the principal is unable
to monitor the agent’s performance sufficiently; and (3) the agent
chooses to maximize her wealth rather than that of the principal. 92 In
the context of litigation, the principal is the client and the agent is the
attorney. In a range of situations, an attorney who is interested in
maximizing her fee may not advance the interests of her client to obtain
the best result in the litigation. 93 For example, assume that an attorney
may charge $300 per hour either to take a deposition that will last four
hours or to submit interrogatories that will take one hour. The
information that would be derived from each method is identical. The
client prefers the attorney to choose the latter course, but the attorney
prefers the former in the absence of more lucrative work elsewhere. 94
Unless the client monitors the work of the lawyer closely (an action that
imposes costs on the client), the lawyer may run up the litigation bill. 95
92. For a general discussion of agency costs, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308 (1976) (“In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive
monitoring and bonding costs (nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be
some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the
welfare of the principal.” (footnote omitted)).
93. The literature applying the agency-costs problem to the conduct of lawyers is vast. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 529, 546–50 (1978) (describing the diverging incentives of the client and the attorney under
both hourly-fee and contingent-fee arrangements); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12–27 (1991) (applying the theory of agency
costs to both standard and class-action legal representation).
94. See Adam I. Muchmore, Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 171, 226 (2013) (“For a defendant-side lawyer working under the traditional hourly fee
arrangement, discovery costs are revenue, pure and simple. The more discovery is necessary in a
case, the more the defendant’s lawyer earns.”); Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the
Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 192 (Winter 1984) (“[U]nder the
American rule economic incentives . . . for hourly fee-for-service lawyers encourage more and
greater discovery.”); see also Weinstein, supra note 47, at 649–50 (arguing that “the lawyer’s
incentive to produce profitable billable hours,” especially in cases involving “lodestar fee-setting
rules or unvigilant clients,” is a principal cause of discovery abuse).
95. The self-regarding lawyer’s interest in using a more expensive discovery method is
independent of the value of the information. For example, suppose that certain information is
worth $1,000. Using a $1,200 deposition to obtain the information is clearly wasteful. If the
information is worth $1,500, however, using a deposition seems worthwhile. But if interrogatories
also yield $1,500 in value at a cost of $300, the deposition is wasteful. Indeed, the client may prefer
the use of interrogatories even if it yields less valuable information. If interrogatories yield
information worth $1,000 and the deposition yields information worth $1,500, the client should
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This list of circumstances in which litigation advances neither
private nor social interests is illustrative rather than exhaustive. It is
possible that, in some instances in which a party acts in an economically
irrational way, social welfare is advanced because the social value of
the lawsuit exceeds the benefits that the party derives from it. But in
many cases, litigation that is privately wasteful is also socially
wasteful. The incentive to engage in such litigation varies under the
American and English rules, but neither rule eliminates the incentives
entirely.
2. The Ineffectiveness of Reforms in Addressing the Problem
Recent reform efforts—higher pleading bars, discovery limits,
case management, and proportionality—do little to stem a party’s
irrational overinvestment in litigation. A higher pleading bar has no
greater capacity to suppress excessive spending by irrationally
optimistic, risk-taking, or principled plaintiffs than by risk-neutral
ones, and we have seen that this bar has little effect on risk-neutral
plaintiffs. 96 Similarly, a higher bar will have no effect on irrational
decisions to recoup sunk costs, which typically arise later in the
litigation. Finally, heightened pleading feeds into the hourly rate
lawyer’s desire to earn more fees, and real-options analysis shows that
a higher pleading bar may also reduce the contingency-fee lawyer’s
reluctance to take on a weak case. 97 A higher pleading bar cuts
indiscriminately across cases that are socially beneficial and those that
are not. The bar is not geared to solve the problem of irrationally
excessive litigation spending. 98
Restrictions on the scope and amount of discovery will have some
effect on parties willing to spend more on a lawsuit than it is worth and
on lawyers seeking to maximize fees at their clients’ expense. As
described before, however, an unduly optimistic party or an
inadequately monitored lawyer may simply channel the money that
prefer the use of interrogatories because the net gain ($500 vs. $300) is greater. In each scenario,
however, the lawyer’s interest is to take the deposition (and perhaps to ask the interrogatories as
well).
96. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. The effect that the higher bar is likely to
have—making rational plaintiffs more likely to file suit—may be exacerbated when the plaintiff is
unduly optimistic, risk-taking, or principled.
97. The reasons are equivalent to those that affect the plaintiff’s decision to file suit. See
supra note 5656 and accompanying text. In brief, a lawyer may decide to file an iffy claim when a
heightened-pleading requirement makes it more likely that the claim will be dismissed at an early
stage because the lawyer’s time commitment before obtaining a decision about the claim’s merit is
less than it would be if the pleading standard were lower and the lawyer needed to invest more
hours before the claim’s merit was determined.
98. See supra text following note 53.
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would have been spent on now forbidden discovery into still permissible
but even less beneficial litigation activity. 99
Other case-management techniques may have some modest
effect. Nonbinding mediation or arbitration may provide an unduly
optimistic or risk-taking party with a sober assessment of the value of
a claim or defense. But those gains must be balanced against losses
arising from the self-regarding lawyer who plays out every litigation
strategy, including participation in ADR, to maximize fees rather than
to advance the client’s interest. 100
Proportionality analysis can be helpful in dealing with excessive
litigation spending. Because disproportional litigation expenditures
benefit neither the parties nor society, the parties might be less
resistant to the imposition of proportionality limits than they would be
in cases in which those expenditures were privately worthwhile. Selfregarding lawyers, however, may still resist such limits. Moreover, the
court still faces the daunting task of applying a series of indeterminate
factors without sufficient information about the value or cost of
discovery.101 Finally, as previously described, proportionality limits
apply only to discovery; the doctrine gives courts no power to limit
litigation activities such as the selection of experts or the filing of
motions. 102
Overall, courts should be able to rein in irrational and excessive
litigation expenditures more successfully than they can prevent
rational but excessive expenditures. But that fact derives more from the
inability of our present and proposed procedural rules to prevent
rationally excessive spending than it does from their ability to hold
down irrationally excessive spending. In neither case will courts be able
to prevent a great deal of socially wasteful expense.
C. Summary
Courts should not suppress litigation activity when another
dollar spent on litigation yields at least another dollar in social
benefit. 103 If we start from this principle, which encourages socially
99. See supra text following note 60.
100. It bears repeating that the data show no perceptible savings from ADR. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
103. Empirical evidence suggests that many cases fall within the bounds of both private
rationality and social optimality. See Kakalik et al., supra note 10, at 636 (reporting that attorneys
were generally satisfied with the discovery process); Willging et al., supra note 10, at 549 tbl.6,
551 tbl.8 (reporting that fifty-four percent of attorneys thought that the expense of discovery was
about right in relation to the amount at stake in the case, and twenty percent thought them too
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optimal investments in litigation, we see that barring access to the
judicial process through heightened pleading or limiting access to
information through controls on the scope and amount of discovery
misses the boat. The issue should be whether access to the courts and
to information is worth the cost. Across-the-board increases in the
pleading bar and cuts in the scope or amount of discovery are crude,
often counterproductive means to strike the cost-benefit balance. 104
Among other reasons, these measures do nothing to limit the
amount of money that parties actually spend on litigation. 105 These
changes in pleading and discovery rules might be justified—but only if
more refined instruments to align private and social incentives to
litigate are lacking. Other instruments that have been suggested to deal
with this issue—such as imposing taxes or fees on those who use the
litigation system wastefully 106—have enjoyed little traction.
Using a proportionality principle that aligns private
expenditures with social benefits appears to be the best solution. But
the principle must be structured in a way that is easy to implement and
extends proportionality beyond discovery to all litigation activities.
From this background the concept of the litigation budget emerges.
III. MANAGING COSTS BY BUDGETING
The basic elements of my proposal for litigation budgeting are
simple. First, the lawyers for each party must prepare a budget that
describes the hours they have spent and estimates the hours they will
spend on each phase of a lawsuit, as well as the hourly rate for their
work. Next, the lawyers must estimate all other expenses (for document
production, for experts, and so on) that they will incur. The budgets are
low; further reporting that, according to the median attorney estimate, discovery constituted three
percent of the total at stake in the litigation).
104. The principal problem with these measures is their single-minded focus on the cost side
of the cost-benefit equation. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on
Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 195–96 (arguing
that, in establishing the right pleading bar, courts should consider both the cost of dismissing
potentially meritorious suits and the cost of litigating potentially meritless suits); Bruce L. Hay,
Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 483 (1994) (arguing that
“the social desirability of discovery depends on whether it induces, at acceptable cost, defendant
precautions against harm”).
105. Cf. Shavell, supra note 18, at 611 (“[R]egulation [of the pretrial and trial processes] by
itself cannot lower litigation costs for a party”).
106. See id. at 587–88, 611 (discussing taxes and fee shifting as options to deal with socially
excessive litigation). As we have seen, shifting fees to the loser does not avoid the mismatch
between private and socially desirable incentives to litigate. See supra notes 34–43 and
accompanying text. Taxes may discourage socially undesirable litigation spending by one party.
But taxes assessed against a plaintiff may also discourage socially valuable litigation, id. at 587,
and taxes assessed against a defendant may increase the plaintiff’s incentive to sue, id. at 588.

2015]

THE LITIGATION BUDGET

883

presented to the clients, to the other parties, and to the court before the
first case-management conference. 107 Each party must either agree to
the other’s budget or file an objection. After receiving the parties’ views,
the court must either approve the budgets or modify them, and enter a
“costs-management order” accordingly. The ultimate standard that the
court must use in evaluating litigation budgets is simple: Are these total
projected expenditures, including costs of judicial administration, less
than the expected social value of the claim? 108
This budgeting process focuses the clients, the lawyers, and the
judge on the total expected costs and benefits of the case—including not
only the private benefits and costs but also the public benefits and costs
that extend beyond the case at hand. 109 A judge who believes that the
total costs are excessive in relation to the total benefits of the case has
a tool—downward modification of the parties’ budgets—to ensure that
costs are kept within bounds.
This Part lays out British and American antecedents to this
litigation-budget proposal, in the process providing details about how
an American litigation-budgeting system should operate. It then shows
that this system corrects the problem of wasteful private incentives
better than existing pleading, pretrial, and discovery reforms.
A. Adjusting the British Approach to the American System
This costs-management proposal is substantially based on the
new costs-budgeting process in the United Kingdom. Like the United
States, the United Kingdom has experienced issues with cost and delay
in civil litigation. Through rule amendments widely known as the Woolf
Reforms, the United Kingdom replaced its extant rules for civil courts
with the Civil Procedure Rules, which came into force in 1999. 110 The
107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (permitting a court to hold pretrial conferences for various
purposes, including for “discouraging wasteful pretrial activities”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B),
(b)(2) (requiring the court to issue a scheduling order, which may occur after a scheduling
conference, within the earlier of 120 days after service on any defendant or ninety days after the
appearance of any defendant).
108. This standard requires more specificity to work in practice. For further discussion, see
infra Part III.A.
109. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
110. The reforms were named for Harry Woolf, then Master of the Rolls and later Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales. Lord Woolf’s report recommended numerous changes in the rules
governing civil litigation. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996). The Civil Procedure Act 1997
conferred the power on the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to enact rules of procedure for civil
courts. Civil Procedure Act, 1997, c. 12, §§ 1–2 (Eng. & Wales). The Committee promulgated the
initial Civil Procedure Rules on December 10, 1998; they became effective on April 26, 1999. Civil
Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, Introductory Text, available at http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1998/3132/introduction/made, archived at http://perma.cc/CW6F-
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Civil Procedure Rules tackled the problems of cost and delay principally
by expanding the judge’s case-management powers. 111 The Woolf
Reforms were generally regarded as successful insofar as reducing
delay was concerned, but they did far less to abate—and may even have
increased—the cost of litigation. 112 After roughly ten years of
experience with the Woolf Reforms, Lord Justice Jackson recommended
another series of reforms to the Civil Procedure Rules to control costs.
Included in these reforms, which became effective on April 1, 2013, were
“costs budgets.” 113
The Civil Procedure Rules spell out the process that make the
costs-budget system work. Barristers prepare their budgets on a
schedule (or “precedent”) that requires them to state their charges for
the services that they have completed for their clients (such as prefiling
and pleading activities) and then to estimate the charges for remaining
tasks (such as discovery and trial). Additionally, barristers must also
include other expenses (such as fees for expert witnesses) as separate
line items. 114 The parties exchange their budgets in advance of a costsmanagement conference. 115 If the parties agree with their opponent’s
budget, the court records the agreement, and those costs are settled; the
NGQ7. A copy of the Civil Procedure Rules presently in force may be accessed at the Ministry of
Justice website, http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules, archived at https://
perma.cc/384K-FBFF?type=source.
111. See Neil H. Andrews, A New Civil Procedural Code for England: Party-Control “Going,
Going, Gone,” 19 CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 23–27 (2000) (outlining the judge’s expanded case-management
powers).
112. See Neil H. Andrews, Accessible, Affordable, and Accurate Civil Justice—Challenges
Facing the English and Other Modern Systems 3–4 (Univ. of Cambridge, Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 35/2013, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330309, archived at http://perma.cc/KVL4-GERE (noting that litigation
costs had been steadily increasing in recent years).
113. Id. at 11–13.
114. See CPR 3.13 (“Unless the court otherwise orders, all parties except litigants in person
must file and exchange budgets as required by the rules or as the court otherwise directs.”);
Practice Direction 3E, ¶ 6, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/
rules/part03/practice-direction-3e-costs-management, archived at http://perma.cc/2D3W-A4G9
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (“Unless the court otherwise orders, a budget must be in the form of
Precedent H annexed to this Practice Direction.”). Precedent H contains twelve line items that
constitute the costs budget: preaction, issues and pleadings, case-management conference,
disclosure, preparation of witness statements, expert witnesses, pretrial review, trial preparation,
ADR and settlement discussions, and contingent costs. For each item, the parties must identify
the assumptions on which the costs are based, as well as the monetary disbursements and hours
for items that have already been incurred and those that are estimated. Precedent H, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/pdf/update/precedent-h.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/46Q8-F526. For the Ministry of Justice’s guidance on how to fill out Precedent H,
see Guidance Notes on Precedent H, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/
civil/pdf/update/new-precedent-h-guidance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DP7Z-WYWV (last
visited Feb. 5, 2015).
115. CPR 3.13, 3.16.

2015]

THE LITIGATION BUDGET

885

court has power to approve or modify a portion of a budget only when
an opposing party refuses consent. 116 If later circumstances warrant,
the court may modify the costs-management order. 117
Importing this process into the American system requires some
adjustments. First, the issue of litigation budgets 118 should be an
additional subject for the scheduling conference, 119 rather than the
subject of a separate costs-management conference. Second, if the goal
is to ensure cost-effective spending on litigation, the parties’ consent to
each other’s budgets should not command automatic judicial approval;
116. See CPR 3.15(2) (requiring the costs-management order to “record the extent to which
the budgets are agreed between the parties,” and then “in respect of budgets or parts of budgets
which are not agreed, record the court’s approval after making appropriate revisions”). Thus, the
court appears powerless to revise costs on which the parties agree. See STUART SIME, A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.19 (16th ed. 2013) (“The primary position is that costs budgets
should be agreed by the parties.”); Practice Direction 3E, ¶ 7.3 (“In so far as the budgets are not
agreed, the court will review them and, after making any appropriate revisions, record its approval
of those budgets.”). With respect to approving those parts of a budget on which there is no
agreement, the Civil Procedure Rules provide no standard. But the Rules twice refer to the need
for costs management to satisfy “the overriding objective” of litigation. See CPR 3.12(2) (“The
purpose of costs management is that the court should manage both the steps to be taken and the
costs to be incurred by the parties to any proceedings so as to further the overriding objective.”),
3.15(2) (discussing the court’s power to make a “costs management order” to record and approve
costs). The first Civil Procedure Rule describes “the overriding objective of enabling the court to
deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.” CPR 1.1(1). Rule 3.15(2) indirectly suggests the
same standard, stating that a court must enter a costs-management order “unless it is satisfied
that the litigation can be conducted justly and at proportionate cost in accordance with the
overriding objective without such an order being made.” The Practice Direction implementing costs
budgeting is in accord, stating that that a court “will consider whether the budgeted costs fall
within the range of reasonable and proportionate costs.” Practice Direction 3E, ¶ 7.3; cf. CPR
44.3(1) (stating that, in its decision to award costs, “the court will not . . . allow costs which have
been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount”).
117. See CPR 3.16(1) (noting the power to hold a costs-management conference to “approve a
revised budget”).
118. I use the term “litigation budgets” rather than “costs budgets” to describe my proposal,
partly to distinguish the extant English approach from my proposal for American courts and partly
to reflect the reality that “costs” has different meanings in English and American practice; in
particular, in American courts “costs” are not usually understood to include attorney’s fees. See 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (2012) (listing costs that a clerk may tax; not listing attorney’s fees); FED. R. CIV. P.
54(d) (allowing a judge to award costs other than attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, and creating
a separate process for the award of attorney’s fees when they can be recovered).
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (requiring a scheduling order in certain federal cases). Although
a scheduling conference is not required before the issuance of a scheduling order, scheduling
conferences are common. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1) (requiring parties to attend a discoveryplanning conference “at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling
order is due under Rule 16(b)”). In cases in which no scheduling conference is held, the parties
would submit their budgets, as well as any objections to other parties’ budgets, along with the
discovery plan. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (requiring the submission of a discovery plan to the
court within fourteen days of the parties’ discovery-planning conference). Like any pretrial order,
a court should be able to amend a costs-management order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (permitting
the modification of scheduling orders “for good cause and with the judge’s consent”), 16(d)
(permitting the modification of other pretrial orders).
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the court should retain some role in ensuring that the budgets are
reasonable and proportionate from society’s standpoint. 120 Third, for
reasons explained later, the court should include specific line-item
limits for expenditures on affirmative discovery (discovery that the
party requests), responding to the discovery requests of the opposing
party, moving to compel discovery, and making pretrial motions. 121
Other features of the English costs-budget system, however,
require substantial tailoring for the American context. First, British
budgets do not include all the costs that parties can expect to incur;
although all of the fees paid to barristers are awardable, a portion of
the fees that clients pay to their solicitors, who do substantial work in
civil litigation, are not. 122 Whatever the merits of that distinction in a
system that separates the work of barristers and solicitors, 123 American
litigation budgets should include all the expenses incurred by lawyers.
Otherwise, the point of the litigation budget—to keep the total costs of
litigation to a socially appropriate level—could be easily circumvented.
Second, the British costs-budgeting process ordinarily applies
only to “multi-track cases.” 124 There is no precise American analogy to
this category, but the idea of excluding some cases from litigation
budgeting is sensible. In federal court, certain cases—which typically
involve little to no discovery—are excluded from scheduling-order and
120. For further discussion of the role that the parties’ consent to one another’s budgets
should play in the judge’s decision, see infra note 155 and accompanying text, infra text following
note 167.
121. See infra notes 146, 149–50, and accompanying text; infra text following note 193.
122. See SIME, supra note 116, § 46.01 (dividing solicitors’ costs into “contentious costs,” which
can be recovered, and “non-contentious costs,” which cannot); id. § 46.02 (“[E]ven a successful
litigant usually has to pay something to its own solicitor . . . .”).
123. See id. §§ 1.06–.17, 1.21 (describing the division of responsibility between barristers and
solicitors with respect to litigation).
124. CPR 3.12(1). There are exceptions; multi-track cases with a monetary value exceeding
£10 million are exempt from costs budgeting, CPR 3.12(1)(a)–(b), as are “multitrack” cases that
are subject to “fixed cost or scale cost,” CPR 3.12(1)(c). The court can also exempt a multi-track
case from costs budgeting by order. Id. Conversely, the court may order parties in cases not on the
multi-track to file budgets. CPR 3.12(1A).
One of the innovations of the Woolf Reforms had been to divide cases into three tracks:
“multi-track cases,” “small claims cases,” and “fast track cases.” Andrews, supra note 111, at 24–
25. “Multi-track cases” are defined as cases that are neither “small claims cases” nor “fast-track
cases.” See CPR 26.6(6) (“The multi-track is the normal track for any claim for which the small
claims track or the fast track is not the normal track.”). In general, “small claims” cases are those
personal-injury cases whose value does not exceed £10,000 and whose claim for pain and suffering
does not exceed £1,000, other cases whose value does not exceed £10,000, and certain landlordtenant disputes. CPR 26.6(1)–(3). Typically, “fast track” cases involve claims whose value does not
exceed £25,000, the trial will likely last no more than one day, and expert witnesses are limited.
CPR 26.6(4)–(5). Other factors, such as the number of likely parties, the complexity of the issues,
and the importance of the case to nonparties, can influence the court’s decision in assigning a case
to a given track. See CPR 26.8.
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mandatory-disclosure requirements. 125 These cases are strong
candidates for exclusion from American costs budgeting, as are cases of
low aggregate value. 126
Third, in the United Kingdom the consequence of failing to
submit a costs budget is draconian: the party cannot recover the bulk of
its costs should it win. 127 Because the United States does not generally
use a loser-pays rule, 128 the sanction for noncompliance must be
different. But this fact poses no significant hurdle. The Federal Rules
already contain an ample set of sanctions that can be brought to bear
on parties that fail to obey scheduling or case-management
requirements;129 the same powers should be available to ensure that
parties abide by their obligations to file litigation budgets.
A fourth, and critical, difference in the two systems arises from
the nettlesome problem of enforcing the parties’ obligation to stay
within their budgets. British courts enforce the obligation through the
expedient of limiting the costs awarded to the prevailing party to the
amount in the budget. 130 This mechanism, however, is an imperfect way
to control costs. Any party who wants to spend more than the costs
budget allows may do so, on the understanding that the money is
coming from the party’s pocket. Parties have an incentive to spend more
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (stating that “categories of actions exempted by local rule” need
not comply with the scheduling-order process); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting certain cases
from mandatory disclosure).
126. Following the British approach, which excludes cases whose value does not exceed
£25,000 (roughly $40,000 at the present rate of exchange), an appropriate cut-off for costs
budgeting might be a case with an aggregate value of $50,000. By “aggregate value,” I mean the
total value of all claims and counterclaims. A class action of one million members, each of whom
has a $100 claim, would require costs budgeting.
127. CPR 3.14 (“Unless the court otherwise orders, any party which fails to file a budget
despite being required to do so will be treated as having filed a budget comprising only the
applicable court fees.”); see Mitchell v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2013] EWCA (Civ.) 1537,
[2014] 1 W.L.R. 795 (Eng.) (holding that, due to his solicitor’s tardy submission of a costs budget,
a party would not be entitled to recover costs, which were listed as £506,425, should he ultimately
prevail).
128. But see supra note 15 (mentioning circumstances in which a loser-pays rule is employed
in American courts).
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f).
130. In awarding costs “on the standard basis,” a British court can deviate from the amount
listed in “an approved or agreed budget” only when it is “satisfied that there is good reason to do
so.” CPR 3.18(b). Costs budgeting does not have an effect on the award of costs when the award is
not made on the standard basis. For instance, in some cases, costs are awarded on “the indemnity
basis.” CPR 44.3(1)(b). Under the “indemnity principle,” a losing party must pay only those of the
winning party’s attorney’s fees that the winning party would have been required to pay its attorney
if it had lost. SIME, supra note 116, § 46.54. In addition, some types of cases, such as low-value car
accidents, involve the award of fixed and scale costs. See CPR Part 45 (pertaining to fixed costs);
SIME, supra note 116, § 46.62 (describing fixed and scale cost cases). Because many of the fixedcost cases would not be on the multi-track, costs budgeting would be inapplicable in any event.
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money than permitted in the budget if doing so influences the expected
recovery by more than the amount expended—even if the added
expenditure would not be socially beneficial. 131
But even this imperfect method of enforcement is unavailable in
American courts, which typically do not employ the loser-pays rule on
which the English system builds costs budgeting. If litigation budgeting
is to work on this side of the Atlantic, parties must not be permitted to
spend more than the amount approved in the budget without judicial
approval of the budget modification. The issue is how to enforce this
obligation.
Two methods are possible. One is to limit the clients’ obligation
to pay their lawyers to the amount listed in the budget for that aspect
of the case. The other is to require the lawyer or party who overspends
the budget to indemnify other parties and the court for the reasonable
costs that they expend responding to the overspending. 132 This
indemnity approach is a tax of the type described by Professor Shavell
—one that requires a party who chooses to use public resources
inefficiently to bear the costs of doing so. 133 But the indemnity approach
also suffers from certain flaws. It comes into play only when a party’s
overspending affects other parties or the court, and it may lead to
satellite litigation about which responsive expenses are “reasonable.”
Therefore, the first mechanism—limiting the client’s responsibility for
fees and costs to the amount contained in the budget—seems more
desirable.
Of course, this mechanism does not prevent collusion between a
client and lawyer to spend more than the budget permits. For two
reasons, however, the prospect of collusion is remote. First, even if the
131. For example, assume that a plaintiff’s case is worth £100,000, and the plaintiff has a
seventy-five percent chance of prevailing. The court establishes a costs budget that, in total, allows
expenditures of £30,000 per side; the court’s own costs are £14,000. The case is socially beneficial
because total costs (£74,000) are less than expected benefits (£75,000). Now assume that if the
plaintiff spends an extra £7,000, the chance of recovery increases to eighty percent. The total costs
(£81,000) now exceed the total benefit (£80,000). It might seem anomalous that the plaintiff would
spend £7,000 to increase the value of the claim by £5,000, but in a loser-pays system, spending an
extra £7,000 increases the net recovery from £60,000 (£75,000 in expected recovery less £15,000
in expected costs (i.e., a twenty-five percent chance of bearing both parties’ budgeted costs of
£60,000)) to £68,000 (£80,000 in expected recovery less £12,000 in expected costs (i.e., a twenty
percent chance of bearing both parties’ budgeted costs of £60,000)). Because £7,000 in additional
investment yields £8,000 in private gain, the British plaintiff will make this socially undesirable
investment.
132. Whether the lawyer or the client should be responsible for this indemnity would depend
on whether the client authorized the additional work. Extending the idea of indemnity to its logical
endpoint, a party could in theory opt out of the budget limits established by a court by agreeing to
indemnify the other party for reasonable costs incurred by that party over and above its budget.
133. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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client initially agrees to pay more to the lawyer, the client has an
incentive to renege on the deal and turn the lawyer in when it comes
time to pay the fee—at least if the court rigorously requires the lawyer
to decline or disgorge any improper fee. 134 Second, under the American
rule, the client has no reason to accede to the lawyer’s request for an
additional fee unless the amount of the fee increases the expected
recovery in an amount greater than the fee. Assuming that the collusive
additional work the lawyer performs causes no additional work for the
opponent or court, the additional work is socially worthwhile, and the
lawyer should be able to request and obtain an upward modification of
the budget without the need for collusion. Assuming that the collusive
additional work also causes additional work for the other party or the
court, the other parties and the court will act as monitors that should
expose the collusion. Moreover, the court can contain the risk of
collusion by requiring the client and lawyer to certify that the client
paid no more, and the lawyer received no more, than the budgeted
amounts for the services rendered. Granted, a certification system is
imperfect, but the small amount of collusive behavior might slip
through is an unavoidable cost of a system that should control litigation
expenditures far better than the present system.
Although the principal inspiration for costs budgeting comes
from England, parties have occasionally been required to submit
litigation budgets in American courts. For instance, in In re Consumers
Power Co. Securities Litigation, the court required “the filing of a
statement of proposed expenses by the plaintiffs and a budget.” 135 The
point of the budget was to make sure that the class representatives,
who were required to bear the costs of the litigation, were fully informed
of the amount of money that they were agreeing to pay. In In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, the court required law firms bidding for the role
of lead counsel in a class action to file litigation budgets with their
bids. 136 The point of this budget was to help to determine the lead
counsel that would best represent the class. On the criminal side,
attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act may be required to

134. If the client and lawyer have an ongoing relationship, however, this check on collusion is
less likely to be effective.
135. 105 F.R.D. 583, 607 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
136. 131 F.R.D. 688, 690–91 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Although the use of bids to select lead counsel
enjoyed some popularity for a period of time, see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:
Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 664–67 (2002)
(describing details of the auction process), auctions came to a screeching halt when the Third
Circuit forbade nearly all lead-counsel auctions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995. In re Cendant Corp., 264 F.3d 201, 277 (3d Cir. 2001).
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file budgets. 137 These budgets ensure that criminal defendants receive
an adequate defense while preserving scarce public funds.
In none of these instances was the purpose of litigation
budgeting precisely the same as it is in this proposal: to counteract the
parties’ incentive to overspend on civil litigation. Indeed, the closest
American antecedent to costs budgeting is the proportionality
requirement of Rule 26. 138 As we have seen, proportionality is the right
idea for containing excessive litigation costs; unfortunately, it lacks a
ready means of enforcement and is limited in scope to the discovery
process. 139 Litigation budgeting overcomes both constraints. Budgeting
provides a practical way to ensure that expenditures are worth their
cost, at the same time avoiding ad hoc and ex post assessments of
present proportionality analysis. Because it applies to all aspects of the
litigation process, litigation budgeting also expands the proportionality
principle to the entire litigation process. Indeed, litigation budgeting is
the logical endpoint of proportionality.
Nevertheless, adopting judicial costs management would be a
significant change in American legal practice. It can be justified only if
it eliminates the parties’ incentives to engage in socially wasteful
litigation practices more effectively than alternatives. The following
section demonstrates that a litigation-budget process does so better
than the reforms considered in Part II.
B. How Budgets Control the Incentive to Overspend
As we have seen, in some cases a party’s incentive to spend
excessively on litigation is rational: because the party does not absorb
all of the costs of its action, its expenditures lead to private gain but
social loss. 140 In other cases a party’s incentive is not rational: imperfect
information, nonneutral risk preferences, or agency costs cause
excessive spending. 141 Because they directly cap expenditures at a
socially justifiable level, litigation budgets have the potential to curtail
both rational and irrational overspending.
137. See Hanna v. Bagley, No. 1:03–cv–801, 2014 WL 1342985, at *1 (Apr. 3, 2014) (noting
that “[p]roposed budgets and resulting budget orders [in capital habeas cases] are not only filed
under seal, but also ex parte”); U.S. DISTR. COURT FOR THE DISTR. OF MD., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
PLAN §§ VIII.C, IX.C, X.F (2004) (requiring appointed counsel to file budgets in capital habeas
cases and capital prosecutions, and giving the court discretion to order “appointed counsel to
prepare and submit budgets in non-capital cases”).
138. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part II.A (explaining how myopic litigants weigh their private gain without
considering the net effect on society as a whole).
141. See supra Part II.B.
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For litigation budgets to do so, however, two conditions must
hold true. First, the judge must set the budgets at a level where
expected social gains exceed expected social costs. Second, the parties
must stay within their budgets. The latter issue I have already
discussed; 142 the former I discuss later. 143 In this Section, I assume that
both conditions pertain. Under these conditions, litigation budgeting is
the best way to address the root causes of excessive spending on
litigation.
1. Controlling the Incentive to Overspend when Private Gains
Exceed Private Costs
Litigation budgeting makes sure that the total costs of litigation,
not just the costs that the party making the expenditure will incur, bear
on decisions about spending. No party can spend an amount that is
privately rational but socially excessive. On the assumption that
budgets are both set appropriately and complied with, spending is also
justified from society’s perspective.
In particular, litigation budgeting can control the resort to
scorched-earth tactics and impositional discovery. Parties cannot
respond with overwhelming force as a way to deter future lawsuits
because the budget ensures that the costs of the present case remain
proportional to the needs of the present case. 144 Budgeting also
contains, although it does not completely eliminate, the parties’
incentive to impose costs through discovery. By definition, impositional
discovery is cheap to request, of limited value to the requesting party,
and very costly to the responding party. 145 Under a litigation-budget
approach, each party is budgeted a certain amount of money to respond
142. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
143. See infra Part IV.A.
144. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing a “scorched earth” litigation tactic
for which the only purpose is to impose costs on the opposing party). In setting the costs budget, a
court may consider the fact that one party (say, the defendant) is a repeat player who is likely to
face related litigation and provide the defendant with a budget sufficient to address certain onetime costs (such as the cost of producing voluminous discovery) that the defendant will incur in
responding to discovery in the first lawsuit. If the court segregates the line items on the budgets
for obtaining discovery, responding to discovery, and making pretrial motions, see supra note 121
and accompanying text, the line items for taking discovery and making motions should still be set
with the value of the present litigation in mind; only the line item for responding to discovery
should be adjusted upwards. Thus, litigation budgeting thwarts a repeat player’s attempt to take
excessive discovery or file excessive motions as a cudgel to discourage future litigation. Conversely,
if the plaintiff’s discovery in the present case might be usable by other plaintiffs suing the
defendant in later cases, the court might adjust the plaintiff’s budget for obtaining discovery
upward.
145. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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to other parties’ discovery requests. Once a responding party hits the
limit for producing information, it has no obligation to produce more
discovery—unless the court increases the production budget. 146 Thus,
parties have little incentive to use impositional tactics because with
those strategies, the requested information has no value, and the
opponent’s cost of responding to the request eats into the resources
available to obtain valuable discovery. Indeed, the parties now have an
incentive to go after the highest-value information at the outset, before
the responding party’s production budget runs out.147
Litigation budgeting is less likely to be effective against
responsive practices like stonewalling or document dumping. This fact
is not surprising: the proportionality principle from which litigation
budgeting derives has more difficulty regulating costly responsive
practices than regulating costly requesting practices. 148 Indeed, the use
of budgets could even encourage both stonewalling and document
dumping. Stonewalling forces the opponent to spend its allotted budget
pursuing the requested information, potentially exhausting its
resources without obtaining anything useful in return. Document
dumping forces an opponent to squander its limited discovery budget
on sorting through the chaff to find a grain of wheat.
But countervailing forces are also at work, especially with
respect to stonewalling. Resisting discovery draws down the resources
of the party who stonewalls as well as those of the party who requests.
In addition, one reason for a lawyer to stonewall is to garner fees; by
resisting discovery for as long as possible, and then capitulating, the
hourly fee lawyer earns more money than by promptly providing

146. Before allowing an amendment to increase in the budget, the court should satisfy itself
that (1) changed circumstances about the expected value of the case warrant an increase and (2)
neither past discovery requests nor the present requests are impositional. Because a motion to
amend the budget is an expense that would come out of the moving party’s line item for making
pretrial motions, parties would not be likely to make such a motion unless it was essential—an
indirect control that further limits the likelihood of impositional discovery requests.
In a litigation-budget world, the problem of impositional discovery is most likely to arise
in cases of asymmetrical information, in which one party has little discoverable information and
the other party has a great deal. In cases of symmetrical information, neither party has a great
incentive to engage in impositional discovery. Should one party do so, the other party could respond
in kind; the mutual assured destruction of each other’s production budget would likely serve
neither party’s interest.
147. Of course, placing a line-item limit on responding to discovery opens the way for
gamesmanship; a responding party may spend the entire budget producing the first ten sheets of
paper and then claim that it has no more money to produce more discovery. When presented with
such a scenario, the court must be willing to sanction a party both by requiring full production and
by subtracting the further costs of this production from other portions of the budget.
148. See supra text following note 85.
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responsive discovery. 149 With a litigation budget, however, the fees that
a lawyer can earn for responding to discovery are capped; thus, any fees
earned for stonewalling are fees not earned for litigation activities that
might be more productive for the client’s case. Finally, if a court finds
that stonewalling occurred, a ready and effective sanction would exist
under a litigation-budget system: charging to the stonewalling party’s
discovery budget the costs of the opponent in obtaining the
information. 150 Because this sanction would thus reduce a stonewalling
party’s own capacity to obtain discovery, each party has a greater
incentive to be forthcoming.
The picture is less rosy for the litigation budget’s capacity to
prevent document dumping. Knowing that the opponent’s budget for
responding to discovery is limited, a party has reason to overwhelm the
opponent with useless, costly-to-process information. Akin to
impositional discovery, one tool that a court may employ to reduce the
incidence of dumping is to assess the requesting party’s costs of sorting
through a document dump against the responding party’s budget, thus
impairing the responding party’s ability to conduct its own discovery.
But this sanction can work as a deterrent only if the court can discern
document dumping from a legitimately broad discovery response.
The most effective way to avoid document dumping is for the
requesting party to tailor specific requests instead of “fishing
expedition” requests that invite dumping. Tailored requests also make
it easier for courts to assess whether dumping has occurred and to
impose a sanction when it has. Indeed, one advantage of litigation
budgeting is its encouragement of tailored discovery. Recall that a
requesting party may have a rational incentive to spend more on
discovery and pretrial than society wishes. In these cases, a litigation
budget limits the party’s ability to spend. A rational party will therefore
seek the most valuable information during discovery. Although
litigation budgeting can do little to prevent document dumping directly,
it can exercise a disciplinary effect that curtails the “fishing expedition”
practices that invite dumping.

149. To the extent that the fees paid to stonewall are less than the change in litigation value
that would ensue if the information were disclosed, the rational client might want the lawyer to
stonewall. On the other hand, to the extent that the fees paid are more than the change in litigation
value, the client would rationally prefer that no stonewalling occur. This latter type of stonewalling
imposes agency costs on the client. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. Litigation
budgeting can respond to both causes of stonewalling.
150. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii) (permitting a court to award to a party who successfully
moves to compel discovery its reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, unless “the opposing
party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified”).
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Courts must still be vigilant about stonewalling and document
dumping. For the most part, litigation budgets will not make the
tendency to engage in stonewalling worse, and in some ways budgeting
may ameliorate the problem. Litigation budgets increase the incentive
to dump documents, but lawyers can tailor discovery requests to limit
the problem. The power to assess costs against the offending party’s
budget also creates a new and effective tool to discourage stonewalling
and dumping. Even if some of this behavior remains, the caps on
spending that litigation budgets impose ensure that, overall, the
amounts spent on litigation will be both privately and socially
worthwhile.
2. Controlling the Incentive to Overspend when Private Costs
Exceed Private Gains
Litigation budgeting can also control the parties’ desire to spend
more on litigation than the likely private gain. Because the court can
take the broad view in setting the parties’ budgets, it can avoid
distorting influences such as excessive optimism or pessimism,
nonneutral attitudes toward risk, or the desire to overspend in order to
recover sunk costs. Nor is the court seeking to vindicate “the principle
of the thing,” so it can keep a reasonable cap on expenditures. Most
significant, costs budgets control agency costs. Lawyers have a budget
within which they must live; they cannot run up their fees with
excessive discovery and motion practice.
Of course, the court must be capable of assessing objectively the
plaintiff’s chances of recovery and the likely amount of recovery. 151 For
this reason, obtaining the input of the parties on the litigation budgets
is useful, as is experience on the bench and a willingness to amend a
budget (upward or downward) when initial impressions prove wrong.
The capacity of litigation budgets to break through the seemingly
intractable problems of agency costs and irrational impulses to
overspend is one of the strongest arguments for their use.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO COSTS MANAGEMENT
Perhaps the most visceral reaction to litigation budgeting is “A
court can’t do that!” Beneath this reaction lie claims either that (1)
courts lack a meaningful standard for setting the budget; (2) litigation
budgeting is unwise because of practical impediments, such as the
151. Cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001)
(describing the results of psychological testing showing “that under certain circumstances judges
rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous judgments”).
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difficulty of adapting budgets to contingency-fee cases or the potential
for gamesmanship; or (3) courts lack the legal and constitutional power
to intrude so deeply into the sphere of attorneys and clients. Although
some of these critiques are articles unto themselves, this Part evaluates
each argument, in the process fleshing out further important details
about litigation budgeting.
A. Objection One: The Standard for Setting Budgets
Until now, I have assumed that a court can accurately assess the
social benefits and costs of a lawsuit, assess the private costs of the
lawsuit, and prepare a budget accordingly—all with very little
knowledge about the nature or strength of the case. Obviously a court
cannot do so with perfect accuracy in every case. But the fear is that
judges will rely on prejudgments about the worth of certain types of
cases, and budgets will take on a “chancellor’s foot” quality in which the
budgets that the parties receive for comparable claims will vary widely
from courtroom to courtroom. 152
A time-honored way to control judicial discretion is to provide
factors that a court must weigh in setting the budgets. The factors
would likely be those that already guide a court’s proportionality
analysis: “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of [the pretrial and trial measures] in resolving the
issues.” 153 But such factors seem no less fuzzy when applied at the
outset of a case to establish budgets than they are in the heat of a case
to decide the proportionality of a request for discovery. 154
152. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (describing Selden’s famous observation
that “to use each equity chancellor’s conscience as a measure of equity . . . would be as arbitrary
and uncertain as measuring distance by the length of each chancellor’s foot”).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (explaining that the court can limit discovery if the burden
of the request will outweigh its benefit). The English system comes to a similar place. The primary
consideration in setting the parties’ costs budgets is the parties’ consent. CPR 3.15(2)(a). In case
of disagreement, the court must “further the overriding objective,” CPR 3.12(2), 3.15(2)(b), which
requires the court “to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost,” CPR 1.1(1). In the related
context of awarding costs at the end of litigation, the court may award only those costs
“proportionately and reasonably incurred” and “proportionate and reasonable in amount” in cases
awarded on the standard basis, CPR 44.4(1)(a)(i)–(ii), and “reasonably incurred” and “reasonable
in amount” in cases awarded on an indemnity basis, CPR 44.4(1)(b)(i)–(ii). Among the factors
guiding this decision, in addition to the “last approved or agreed budget,” CPR 44.4(3)(h), are “the
conduct of all the parties,” CPR 44.4(3)(a); “the amount or value of the money or involved,” CPR
44.4(3)(b); “the importance of the matter to all the parties,” CPR 44.4(3)(c); “the particular
complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised,” CPR 44.4(3)(d); and
the lawyer’s skill and time spent on the case, CPR 44.4(3)(e)–(f).
154. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of applying the
present proportionality standard).
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Perhaps this difficulty is why the English approach initially puts
the matter of budgets into the parties’ hands, requiring the court to
accept their budgets to the extent they consent. 155 This approach also
makes sense in the British context for other reasons. Because the losing
party is liable for the winner’s costs but neither party knows at the
outset who will lose, both sides have an incentive to keep costs
reasonable. Moreover, there is a certain rough justice in assessing costs
to which the other party, with an opportunity to object, has consented.
But consent cannot serve as the basis of the American approach.
Without a loser-pays rule but with the American adversarial tendency
to seek any advantage, parties would rarely consent to their opponents’
budgets. Moreover, relying on consent raises the prospect of collusion,
in which one lawyer consents to the other side’s oversized budget in
return for the other lawyer’s tacit agreement not to dispute its own
oversized budget.
So how is a court to approve a budget? The court’s first step must
be to determine the potential private benefit of a lawsuit. In
determining this benefit, the court should start with the claimant’s
position. In federal court, plaintiffs already disclose to their opponents
“a computation of each category of damages” by the time that the
scheduling order is issued. 156 If this computation were shared with the
court before the scheduling conference, 157 the court would have the
plaintiff’s assessment of the value of the case. 158 A claimant has an
incentive not to puff the claim’s value unduly; an unrealistically high
valuation might induce a judge to award a larger budget to the
defendant, who then would have more funds with which to engage in
scorched-earth or impositional tactics.
This computation is only a starting point; no judge should
blindly accept a party’s estimate of the value of a case. Sometimes a
judge’s experience provides some sense of the case’s value. The court
should also rely on statistical evidence. As part of a litigation-budget
initiative, the Federal Judicial Center, which conducts statistical
analyses of the federal docket, should determine the mean and median
values at settlement (and after trial) for basic categories of cases on the
155. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
156. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (requiring disclosure to an opponent of a computation
of damages and the evidence on which it is based); 26(a)(1)(C) (requiring disclosure to be made
within fourteen days of the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference); 26(f)(1) (requiring the parties’
conference to be held at least twenty-one days “before the scheduling conference is to be held or a
scheduling order is due”).
157. On the blending of the scheduling and costs-budgeting tasks into one conference, see
supra note 119 and accompanying text.
158. The obligation to disclose damage computations should be broadened to require an
estimation of the value of injunctive relief.
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federal civil docket, as well as the success rates of the cases that go to
trial. 159 This information will provide judges with a rough idea of the
expected value of claims—a benchmark by which they can test against
their experiences and the parties’ submissions.
The expected value of the lawsuit to the plaintiff should
presumptively be regarded as the full benefit of the lawsuit. Some
lawsuits involve private benefits beyond the relief obtained. 160 But
these benefits may be difficult to quantify. They may also be socially
undesirable. For instance, the litigation may be designed to stifle
socially beneficial competition from the plaintiff’s competitors.
Therefore, except in compelling cases in which quantification of the
private nonlitigation benefits is easy and there is no social detriment
associated with these benefits, a court should ignore private
nonlitigation benefits in determining the value of the claim.
In the second step, the court should assess the costs of resolving
the litigation. This assessment begins with the parties’ proposed
budgets and with their positions (agreement or dissent) with respect to
the budget(s) filed by their opponent(s). As a rule, the judge must accept
the costs provided on each party’s budget; the judge may, however,
strike glaringly needless and costly budget items to which an opponent
objects. 161 After determining these private costs, the court should add
the estimated cost of judicial resources necessary to resolve the dispute.
In the third step, the court compares the private benefits of the
lawsuit to the costs of resolving it. If the benefits exceed these costs,
then the court must presumptively approve the budgets, regardless of
the parties’ consent or opposition to one another’s budgets. If the private
costs exceed the private benefits, then the court must presumptively
trim the budgets to a point at which the costs and benefits come into
balance.

159. See 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1) (2012) (providing that one function of the Federal Judicial
Center is “to conduct research and study of the operation of the courts of the United States, and to
stimulate and coordinate such research and study on the part of other public and private persons
and agencies”). At present, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts also collects basic
data on federal cases, including by nature of suit. Civil suits are divided into the following
categories: contract, real property, tort, civil rights, various prisoner and detainee petitions,
forfeiture and penalty actions, labor suits, Social Security actions, and others. See ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, tbl.C-3 (2013), http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C03Sep13.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/8NZQ-QH33.
160. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
161. Thus, the parties’ consent or opposition to items contained in an opponent’s proposed
budget is relevant only to the extent that opposition reveals an egregious expense that a court is
justified in striking. On the larger role that consent or opposition plays in the British system, see
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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In the fourth and final step, a party can seek to overcome the
presumption. If the presumption favors approval (in other words, the
benefits obtained from the case exceed the costs of resolving it), a party
may seek to prove that the case involves public costs that, when added
to the private costs of the litigation, tip the case from one involving a
net social benefit to one involving a net social loss, thus requiring the
court to trim the budgets. 162 Courts should not readily accede to parties’
arguments about including alleged public costs. In the first place, the
public costs of litigation are difficult to quantify. Moreover, arguments
about the public costs of litigation may be a thinly masked effort to
argue that either a legal rule or its application to the case is unwise.
The court should turn a deaf ear to these arguments: When lawmakers
create a right, the court should presume that its full enforcement is a
public benefit. Legitimate concerns about the law’s application should
already be accounted for in the case’s probability of success.
Nonetheless, in rare cases a public loss may be easily quantified
and is not merely a proxy argument about the value of enforcing the
law. For example, a defendant may show that it has already provided
much of the requested relief in parens patriae or similar actions, so that
the compensation requested in the present suit would lead to excessive
deterrence.163 In these cases a court may add the public costs of
litigation to the private costs reflected on the parties’ budgets to
determine the overall social cost of the lawsuit. 164
If the total social cost now outweighs the private gain, the court
must allow the opposing party to prove that the case has value to the
public that extends beyond the private gain to that party—and that this
public value tips the scales in favor of approving the budgets. As with
162. If a case involves social losses but they are less than the net private gain from the lawsuit,
then the case is still a net gain, and the budgets should be approved. On the trimming of budgets,
see infra note 167 and accompanying text.
163. On the use of parens patriae and agency settlements to provide relief, see Margaret H.
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126
HARV. L. REV. 486, 511–30 (2012); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
500, 520–39 (2011).
164. To take an example, in Iqbal the Supreme Court imposed heightened pleading in part
because of the social loss (in terms of reduced governmental efficiency) that lawsuits against
government officials imposes. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (“Litigation, although
necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and
expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper
execution of the work of the government.”); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)
(noting that lawsuits against officials impose the “general costs of subjecting officials to the risks
of trial—distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action,
and deterrence of able people from public service”). Such a social loss would qualify for
consideration in setting the budget but only if a party could quantify the size of the loss. General
claims of social loss must be ignored.
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public losses, any party arguing for the inclusion of public benefits must
be able to quantify the benefit; generic arguments about the benefit of
enforcing the law will not do. For instance, the lawsuit may involve a
constitutional or public-law right, the vindication of which has great
public value but modest private value. 165 In the language of
proportionality, “the importance of the issues at stake in the action” 166
may lead a court to decide that the combination of the private and public
benefits of a case exceeds the combination of its private and public costs,
even when the private benefit alone does not.
Conversely, if the presumption favors trimming the parties’
budgets, a party may seek to overcome the presumption by showing that
the public benefits of the case, when combined with the private benefits,
exceed the private costs. For instance, a lawsuit may be the first in a
series of mass torts or mass consumer disputes, for which the start-up
costs are necessarily high in relation to the value of the plaintiff’s case.
When spread across all of the later cases that will benefit from the
lawsuit’s pathbreaking work, however, the costs are reasonable. If the
quantifiable public benefits overcome the presumption calculus, the
opposing party may then argue that the court should consider
quantifiable public costs in establishing a proper budget.
In balancing benefits and costs, the court’s only role is to ensure
that the expected private and public costs of litigation are less than its
private and public gains, not to tweak and trim the budgets to achieve
the greatest social benefit. The purpose of litigation budgets is to ensure
that the benefits of litigation exceed the costs. As long as this condition
is met, further judicial intervention in the parties’ expenditures is
unwarranted; the amounts that parties spend on the lawsuit are their
own business.
165. Because of the difficulty of quantifying constitutional rights, a court might appropriately
exempt structural-reform and other public-law litigation seeking injunctive relief from the
operation of the litigation-budgeting process. The private value of a constitutional right (for
instance, the right not to say a Christian prayer in a public school) may be difficult to discern; so,
for that matter, is the social value of ensuring governmental compliance with fundamental
constitutional norms. Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 181–87 (4th ed. 2010)
(discussing the difficulty of valuing constitutional rights). Moreover, structural-reform cases rarely
involve the type of cost issues that drive the arguments for litigation budgeting; the lawyers who
typically represent plaintiffs in such institutional-reform cases and the government’s lawyers are
salaried workers with large case dockets and so typically have reason to handle the litigation as
expeditiously as possible. Of course, the statements in the prior sentence are generalizations, so
in proper circumstances a court may nonetheless impose litigation budgets on parties in
structural-reform and other similar public-law litigation. But general exemption of these cases
from the litigation-budgeting process removes one of the most potent criticisms of budgeting
(“Courts can’t value the social benefits of litigation.”) in the group of cases in which that criticism
has its greatest salience.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
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In a substantial number of cases, expected benefits will exceed
expected costs, 167 so the court’s principal task will be to ensure that the
parties live within their budgets. In some cases, however, the court will
find that the expected social costs of litigation exceed the expected social
benefits. Here the court must generally trim the parties’ budgets. If the
balance of benefit and cost is close, the court may nonetheless approve
the budgets if both parties consent to one another’s budgets: the court
must be mindful of the limits of its knowledge about the case. But
otherwise the court must reduce the parties’ budgets to appropriate
levels. In deciding the amount to trim, the court should consider the
public importance of the litigation, as well as the likely value of
discovery, pretrial motions, and other litigation activities in resolving
the dispute. It should also apply any cuts in an even-handed way,
although fairness might not be a simple matter of pro rata cuts to both
sides’ budgets. The court may believe that only one side padded its
budget and extract all the necessary cuts from that side. The court may
cut back on only certain line items. The court may leave the consentedto portions of the budgets untouched, or it may look to these portions
for savings. Whatever the approach, the court’s goal is to bring the
social gains from a lawsuit in line with its costs. Over time, as judicial
experience with litigation budgets develops and empirical data help
courts to refine their analyses, best practices should make the task of
trimming simpler.
Thus, although the factors in the litigation-budgeting process
are essentially the same as those under the proportionality analysis of
Rule 26, their application is not as open-ended. “The needs of the case”
and “the amount in controversy,” properly understood to refer to a
comparison of the expected private benefits and expected private and
judicial costs in resolving the case, are the baseline factors in all cases.
But when private gains exceed private and judicial costs, the
proportionality inquiry ends, and the court’s only job is to keep the
parties within their budgets. “The importance of the issues at stake in
the action” can tip a case from one in which the court must reduce the
budget (because private and public losses exceed private gains) to one
in which the court approves the budget (because private plus public
gains exceed private plus public losses). “The importance of [the pretrial
and trial measures] in resolving the issues” helps a court, along with
167. After reviewing studies about the costs of the tort system, Professors Polinsky and
Shavell concluded “that, for each dollar that an accident victim receives in a settlement or
judgment, it is reasonable to assume that a dollar of legal and administrative expenses is
incurred.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 36, at 1470. If the average case is one in which recovery
and costs are evenly balanced, a substantial number of cases should lead to judicial approval of
the parties’ budgets.

2015]

THE LITIGATION BUDGET

901

other factors, to decide how much to trim the parties’ budgets when
losses exceed gains. 168
Throughout this process, but particularly when it must
intervene to limit the parties’ budgets, the risk of judicial error exists.
Two factors offset this risk. First, on a large scale, errors may wash out;
even if courts sometimes allow budgets that are too large and other
times allow budgets that are too small, spending on litigation should
come close to hitting the socially appropriate mark as long as judges as
a whole are not systematically overvaluing plaintiffs’ prospects (or
conversely, systematically undervaluing them).
This perspective is cold comfort to individuals in cases in which
errors are made, but a second factor can limit case-by-case mistakes. As
a case progresses, a party can seek a revision of the initial budget. If
the evidence obtained in discovery reveals that the claim is stronger
than it originally appeared, the court may revise the budget upward. If
the case appears weaker and if the court would now be justified in
trimming the parties’ budgets in accordance with the principles just
described, the court can revise the budget downward. 169
B. Objection Two: Practical Problems in Implementing
Litigation Budgets
Aside from the practical difficulty of approving proper budgets,
a court faces other practical challenges. Here I highlight two: the
problem of determining fees—both contingent and hourly—for legal
work and the likelihood of gamesmanship in a litigation-budgeting
system.

168. The only present proportionality factor that this analysis does not directly include is “the
parties’ resources.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The point of litigation budgeting is to ensure the
cost-effective expenditure of the parties’ resources. Insofar as the “parties’ resources” is a reference
to the parties’ relative wealth, litigation budgeting ignores this consideration.
169. To avoid gamesmanship in the processes of setting and amending budgets, an
amendment of the court’s original budget should require a strong showing (perhaps equivalent to
the manifest-injustice standard of Rule 16(e)). Consistent with the review of trial courts’ other
case-management powers, the appellate standard for reviewing the court’s decisions regarding
budgets should be abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Bayer Healthcare & Merial Ltd. Flea Control
Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 752 F.3d 1065, 1072 (6th Cir. 2014) (“This court ‘typically
review[s] a district court’s case-management decision made pursuant to Rule 16 for abuse of
discretion.’ ” (quoting Miller v. Am. Heavy Lift Shipping, 231 F.3d 242, 252 (6th Cir. 2000))); ZF
Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We . . . review a district court’s
decisions regarding discovery and case management for abuse of discretion.”).
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1. Budgets and Fees
A major cost of litigation is attorney’s fees. In setting limits on
the amount to be paid for pleading, discovery, motions, negotiations,
trial, and the like, the number of hours or the fee that a lawyer charges
inevitably weigh on a court. One of the most objectionable aspects of
litigation budgeting is the apparent control that the court now exercises
over attorney’s fees. This objection comes in two forms: first, that judges
should not establish rates that lawyers can be paid; and second, that a
litigation-budget system cannot work with contingent fees.
a. The Hourly Fee. The judge’s influence over attorney’s fees is
limited but consequential. Assume that the defendant submits a budget
with a line-item limit of $100,000 for conducting affirmative discovery.
In setting this line item, an attorney paid by the hour is likely to
determine the number of hours that it will take to complete the task
(say, 250) and multiply it by the lawyer’s rate (say, $300 per hour), and
then add to this total ($75,000) the remaining expenses like travel,
expert witnesses, and court reporters (say, $25,000). If the parties’
budgets, plus the court’s own costs, amount to less than the gains of the
case, the judge approves the budget. The size of the fee is never the
judge’s business. The judge’s only obligation is to ensure that the client
pays no more than $100,000 for the case.
When the combination of the parties’ proposed budgets and
judicial costs exceeds the social value of the case, however, the judge
more actively manages costs. When faced with the proposed line item
of $100,000 to conduct discovery, the judge will consider the same cost
components: the fee for the attorney and the expenses for travel and the
like. The judge will almost certainly determine a proper charge for the
lawyer by calculating the number of hours that an attorney should
reasonably work to accomplish discovery and multiplying those hours
by a reasonable hourly rate. Assume that the judge believes that 200
hours for discovery are sufficient and $250 is a reasonable hourly rate.
After determining that $50,000 is a proper fee, the judge will then add
in other expenses and fees. If we assume that these fees remain
constant at $25,000, the judge will approve a budget of $75,000 for the
party to conduct discovery.
That said, the judge does not directly control the lawyer’s hours
or hourly rate. The lawyer need not work 200 hours or charge $250 per
hour. The lawyer who scrimps on expenses and stays at Motel 6 may
still be able to charge $300 per hour. The lawyer may conduct only 125
hours of discovery and charge $400 per hour. Or the lawyer may work
more hours (say, 400) and charge less per hour (say, $125). The client’s
obligation is to pay $75,000 for the task of conducting discovery; the
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lawyer figures out how to keep the client’s representation within that
limit.
Nevertheless, the judge’s influence over hourly rates is
undeniable. Lawyers must set hours and rates for various tasks with
an eye toward what a judge will approve. Many lawyers who charge
higher fees will feel particularly aggrieved by budget setting. In some
cases, higher fees may be a reflection of the lawyer’s expertise and
efficiency; to the extent that this is true, the lawyer needs to work fewer
hours, and the matter will wash out. But higher fees may also be a
reflection of higher overhead costs or of quality independent of
expertise; and a judge should not interfere, the argument goes, in the
relationship between a client willing to spend the money and a lawyer
worth the price. Limiting the budget to $50,000 means that these
lawyers will be able to work fewer hours than their lower-rate opponent
(thus limiting their effectiveness in serving their clients), or that they
will need to cut their fees. In either event, the standard of legal practice
will fall into mediocrity; if the judge believes that a reasonable rate is
$300 per hour, there is little incentive for lawyers to excel in ways that
would justify a higher fee. Furthermore, the power to limit costs could
have a substantial dislocating effect, as lawyers with offices in midtown
Manhattan found themselves at a competitive disadvantage with firms
on midwestern Main Streets. 170
An apparent compromise is to give a judge the power to limit the
hours that lawyers may work but to allow the lawyers to bill at
whatever rate the market bears. The difficulty of this compromise is
that it does not address adequately the principal point of litigation
budgeting: the direct control of litigation costs, of which attorney’s fees
are a major driver. Moreover, limiting hours rather than fees is feckless.
Judges possess familiarity with the rates of law firms from their
decisions in fee-shifting cases 171 and in imposing sanctions; 172 if lawyers
are required to fill out a form equivalent to the English Precedent H,
they will also need to list their hourly rate for each pretrial and trial

170. It could also have a different dislocating effect, as lawyers at multi-service firms raise
rates on a client’s nonlitigation work to compensate for reductions in litigation rates. Whether
clients would pay above-market rates for transactional work in a wink-and-nod arrangement to
keep litigation rates artificially low is doubtful, as long as other firms are willing to work for
market rates.
171. See supra note 15 (describing fee-shifting statutes).
172. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (permitting a court to award “all of the reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses” in responding to a Rule 11 violation); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)
(permitting a court in some situations to award a litigant who moves for a motion to compel
discovery “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees”).
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task in their budgets. 173 Knowing the number that they need to make
the budget work (say, $75,000 for the defendant’s conducting of
discovery), judges would use their knowledge of hourly rates to reverse
engineer the number of hours a lawyer can work.
Without question, the potential chill on the quality of lawyering
is a troublesome feature of litigation budgeting. A solution that rewards
quality lawyering is to allow a judge, at the end of a case, to award a
modest enhancement to the attorney’s fees when the judge sees
exceptional skill—lawyering that meets the highest standard of
professionalism, that is civil and cost-effective, and that yields greater
benefits for a client than the judge anticipated. Unlike the present fee
structure, in which higher fees are often based on past performance or
firm reputation, this enhancement is earned for work in the present
case. The judge should grant an enhancement—whose possibility
should be communicated to clients at the outset—only in an exceptional
case and only sua sponte; for obvious reasons, lawyers should not be
allowed to petition the court for an enhancement. 174
Given its inevitable effect on attorney’s fees, litigation budgeting
may lose its luster for many. But it is important to recall why it is
necessary to impose limits that have an impact on hourly rates. Certain
cases cost too much to litigate. In the cases that do not, litigation
budgeting imposes no limits on the ability of lawyers to charge
whatever rates their clients are willing to pay; and the kinds of disputes
for which high-fee firms are typically employed—major antitrust
violations, securities-fraud claims, class actions, and multidistrict mass
torts—often involve sums of money so large that they fall into this
category. For those cases in which fees drive up costs to the point that
the costs exceed the social value of the lawsuit, however, the lawyer’s
desire to work an unrestricted number of hours while charging an
unrestricted rate must give way to society’s needs to use precious
judicial resources in a cost-effective way. As we have seen, clients will
pay excessively for litigation in two scenarios: when they rationally
expect private gains to exceed private costs and when they irrationally
have the same expectation. 175 When the client’s willingness to
overspend on litigation does not rationally advance its interests, the
lawyer’s ethical responsibility is to help the client come to a rational
173. See Precedent H, supra note 114, at 2–5 (including a column requiring lawyers to list
their hourly rates with respect to various tasks such as investigation, pleading, disclosure, trial
and settlement).
174. Granting an enhancement for quality lawyering may prove unduly problematic in states
with an elected judiciary, for enhancements may too readily appear to be kickbacks to lawyers who
provided campaign donations or other support during the judge’s election.
175. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
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decision about litigation spending, not to bill unlimited hours at
unrestricted rates to placate the client’s irrationality. When the client’s
decision to overspend is rational, the lawyer has obligations not only to
the client but also to the court to ensure the fair and efficient
administration of justice. 176
Litigation budgeting does not allow judges to set hourly fees
directly. But it has an undeniable influence over the rates that litigators
can charge—an influence that is necessary “because that’s where the
money is.” 177 Any costs-management reform that fails to address the
impact of unrestricted attorney’s fees and unlimited attorney hours on
litigation costs is bound to fail. The litigation budget’s influence over
rates is something of a litmus test for anyone interested in enacting
reforms to control the costs of modern American litigation. If litigation
budgeting seems a bridge too far, then we should give up the pretense
that we are serious about cutting the cost of civil litigation.
b. The Contingent Fee. A different problem arises for contingency
fees, which are commonly used by plaintiff’s lawyers in tort litigation. 178
Because the lawyer is not guaranteed payment, the fee includes a risk
premium: if successful, the lawyer is likely to earn more for the case
than he would have earned had he charged by the hour. 179
176. See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[L]awyers serve both as
zealous representatives of their clients and as officers of the court with responsibilities for fairness
and disclosure that transcend their clients’ interests.”). Moreover, lawyers possess an ethical
responsibility not to overcharge their clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)
(2013) (“A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses.”). The factors typically considered in a fair fee—including the
lawyer’s time, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the lawyer’s skill, the customary fee changed
in the locality, and “the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer”—are not different than
those a court should consider in the costs-budget process. See id. The problem is that, despite this
professional admonition to keep fees within bounds, “there appears to have been very little effort
to apply it.” Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green, Legislative and Judicial Controls of
Contingency Fees in Tort Cases, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 82 (1996).
177. This answer was reportedly given by Willie Sutton when he was asked why he robbed
banks, although Sutton denied that he ever made the statement. See WILLIE SUTTON, WHERE THE
MONEY WAS: THE MEMOIRS OF A BANK ROBBER 120 (1976). The answer has given rise to “Sutton’s
Law”: to look first in obvious places for a solution. See David S. Prince, Sutton’s Law and Economics
Applied to the Professional Fiduciary: Helping the Trustee Avoid Predatory Litigants, 119 BANKING
L.J. 17, 17 (2002). The most obvious place to look for a solution to excessive litigation costs is
attorney’s fees.
178. Contingency-fee arrangements are not limited to tort cases, although they are
“essentially prohibited” in areas like divorce and criminal work. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2013); see also Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 35–42 (1989) (describing the
historical development of and remaining prohibitions on contingency fees).
179. See Brickman, supra note 178, at 31–32 (arguing that some contingency fees are
unethical because “the contingent fee far exceeds any legitimate risk premium for the anticipated
effort”).
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One of the difficulties of litigation budgeting is its capacity to
account for this risk premium, whose payment advances the social
interest of increasing access to courts and legal representation for those
of modest means. 180 Trying to value this interest in determining an
appropriate budget is a daunting challenge. Assume that the court
calculates the expected recovery at $60,000. Thus, a standard one-third
contingency fee yields an expected fee of $20,000. Some portion of that
fee is for the work in this case; some is to compensate for the risk of
nonpayment in this and other cases. Because the social good is
advanced by the lawyer’s willingness to take on this risk, the court
should not treat the latter portion of the fee as a cost in this case for
purposes of litigation budgeting. But how is a court to know what is the
correct portion of the fee to charge against this case when assessing the
size of the plaintiff’s budget?181
One solution is to exempt all contingency-fee cases from
litigation budgeting. But that idea is unappealing, for litigation
budgeting will exercise an outsized influence in driving lawyers toward
contingent fees. Contingency-fee cases also constitute a significant
portion of all litigation. 182 If we are serious about reducing costs, it
would be unwise to ignore such a large swath of cases—at least if there
is a workable alternative.
The other realistic option is to reform the contingency fee. 183
Courts should determine the plaintiff’s lawyer’s fee on the basis of two
180. See id. at 43–44 (stating that “contingent fees encourage litigation, thereby furthering
the national policy in favor of increasing access to courts” and “further promote access to the legal
process by encouraging less risk-averse lawyers with larger practices to accept cases that might
otherwise go unrepresented because of the risk of non-recovery and the client's inability to pay an
hourly or fixed fee”).
181. In a sense, this question is a specific application of the problem that courts face when
determining how to value the social benefit of a lawsuit. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying
text (stating courts should generally ignore private nonlitigation benefits when assessing a claim’s
value).
182. Approximately 23.8 percent of federal cases commenced in fiscal-year 2013 were tort
cases (67,738 tort out of 284,604 total). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note
159, tbl.C–2A, at 1, www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/
C02ASep13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZNV-2YN2. Although the mix of litigation in federal
court is not identical to that in state court, and although tort cases are not synonymous with
contingency-fee cases, this percentage provides a very crude estimate of the scope of contingencyfee litigation.
183. Another option is to limit not the fee charged but the hours that contingency-fee lawyers
may work—on the theory that working fewer hours will reduce the size of the judgment or
settlement and thus keep the costs of the contingency fee down. The judge could calculate the
hours that the contingency-fee lawyer should put into each task by taking an appropriate total
charge for the attorney’s work for each aspect of the case and dividing by an appropriate hourly
rate; the judge could then restrict the lawyer to working only these hours. This approach however,
is unsatisfactory. Given that the client wants the lawyer to work more hours and the lawyer wants
to earn a higher fee, there is no effective way to monitor that the lawyer limits his hours—while
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components: first, hours worked for different tasks times a reasonable
hourly fee; and second, a percentage of the ultimate recovery. The
former component compensates the lawyer for his time on the case; it
constitutes the amount that is chargeable as an expense in the present
case. The latter component contains the risk premium; it compensates
the lawyer for the socially valuable risk that he took on in accepting the
case.
On this approach, the contingency-fee lawyer, like the defense
lawyer, must prepare the plaintiff’s litigation budget by specifying the
hours to be worked on each line-item task (investigation, pleading,
discovery, trial, and so on) and the appropriate hourly fee for each task.
On the basis of the principles that I have discussed, the judge must
either accept the plaintiff’s budget or reduce it to a level that keeps costs
within acceptable boundaries. 184 The case then proceeds to its
conclusion. If the plaintiff receives nothing, the lawyer receives no fee.
If the case yields a positive recovery, the judge totes up the approved
fees on the litigation budget for each task that the contingency-fee
lawyer ultimately performed. This number becomes the plaintiff’s
lawyer’s base award. The court then enhances the base award by an
appropriate percentage of the recovery and adds it to the base fee. The
size of the enhancement should reflect social value of taking on a risky
case; the value of the lawyer’s services in the present case are accounted
for in the base award. 185 In effect, the court awards a fee on something
akin to a lodestar basis. 186
the hourly-fee defense lawyer on the other side of the case is handcuffed to work only the prescribed
number of hours. Nor do limitations on the hours worked necessarily correlate with the size of the
fee; as we have seen, limiting hours rather than fees is a poor way to control costs. See supra notes
171–73 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part IV.A.
185. Given that the incentive to assure access to courts is a principal component of the social
value of contingency fees, a critical factor in determining the appropriate risk-premium percentage
is the degree of risk that the lawyer took on in accepting the case. Cf. Brickman, supra note 178,
at 94–99 (advocating the use of contingency fees that are calibrated to the degree of risk the case
presents). In rare cases, an additional amount may be awarded for superb representation. Cf.
supra note 174 and accompanying text (permitting a rare enhancement of the hourly fee to account
for exceptional representation).
186. The lodestar approach multiplies the hours that class counsel reasonably expended by
the prevailing hourly rate; the court can then adjust this award upward or downward depending
on the quality of representation, the degree of success, the risk associated with the litigation, the
complexity of the case, and other factors. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/
Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (listing ten factors in
determining a fee award). Lodestars are often used to award attorney’s fees under fee-shifting
statutes. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (holding that “‘reasonable fees’ under
§ 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community”);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for determining
the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”); Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 307
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The court’s role in overseeing contingency fees is different than
it is with respect to lawyers paid by the hour in two regards. First, with
hourly fee lawyers the court’s role in setting fees is indirect; the court
approves a maximum amount that the client is obligated to pay the
lawyer for performing certain litigation tasks but does not set the fee. 187
In the contingency area, however, the court directly determines the
risk-premium portion of the fee. Second, with hourly fee lawyers the
court has no power to limit hourly fees or expenditures when the private
gains from litigation exceed the total costs; its power to limit costs arises
only in cases in which the budgets suggest that the costs of litigation
exceed the gains of the lawsuit. 188 In the contingency area, in contrast,
the court must determine the proper percentage of the recovery to
award even in cases in which the private gains exceed the costs.
The reason is that, without such a constraint, the contingencyfee lawyer is free to work many more hours than the hourly fee lawyer
representing the defendant, creating an unfair imbalance in the
litigation. For example, assume that the case involves horrific injuries
and is worth an expected $3 million. The plaintiff’s lawyer thus stands
to gain $1 million from the case on a standard one-third contingency.
But the facts of the case are fairly simple, and the liability clear. The
plaintiff’s budget reflects that the plaintiff’s lawyer expects to put in
500 hours on the case, and the reasonable hourly charge for his services
is $300 per hour. In addition, other litigation expenses (i.e., expert
witnesses and the like) amount to $50,000. Thus, on the plaintiff’s side,
expenses are $200,000. The defense has similar expenses, and the
court’s time to resolve the dispute is $50,000. The $450,000 in total
expected costs is considerably less than the expected recovery of $3
million.
On these facts, the $850,000 differential between the
contingency award ($1 million) and the value of the work performed
F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In a common fund case, the district court has discretion to apply
either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a fee award.”); cf.
McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417–19 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the trend toward
the percentage-of-the-fund approach in common-fund cases, but upholding the use of a lodestar
approach).
The costs-budget approach varies from a traditional lodestar in modest ways. First, it
enhances the award on a percentage-of-recovery basis, which is a common, but not the only,
method for calculating the lodestar. Second, the factors that determine the appropriate percentage
focus on the social value of the lawyer’s representation, and are therefore somewhat different from
the factors presently used to calculate lodestars. Finally, in theory a lodestar is not capped by the
size of the plaintiff’s recovery (i.e., the plaintiff could end up paying a larger fee than the benefit
received), although in practice it is likely to be. Under the approach I describe, this cap is
automatic.
187. See supra Part IV.B.1.a.
188. See supra Part IV.B.1.a.

2015]

THE LITIGATION BUDGET

909

($150,000) excessively compensates the plaintiff’s lawyer for the risk of
taking on the case. But the real difficulty is that, unless the plaintiff’s
lawyer is limited to a $150,000 base fee plus a risk-compensating
percentage of the ultimate award, the lawyer may have an incentive to
work far more than 500 hours. As long as an additional hour of work
will yield more than an additional $300 in fees (in other words, will
raise the value of the case by more than $900189), the contingency-fee
lawyer has an incentive to do so. Moreover, the plaintiff is pleased to
allow the lawyer to work the additional hours, so there is no effective
monitor that limits the hours that the plaintiff’s lawyer may work. The
defense, however, is handcuffed. Paid by the hour, defense counsel
cannot receive compensation for the additional hours that might be
necessary to respond to the plaintiff’s lawyer’s efforts without obtaining
a budget revision.
An important side effect of this change to the standard
contingency fee is that it aligns the incentives of the plaintiff and
counsel. This hourly-plus-percentage-of-the-recovery fee was first
proposed by Kevin Clermont and John Currivan. Their seminal work
demonstrates how this structure avoids agency-cost problems typically
arising with traditional contingency fees or hourly fees. 190 This side
benefit enhances the desirability of using a litigation-budgeting
process, although it is not the principal argument for doing so.
The evident problem with modifying contingency fees is the
involvement of courts—in thousands upon thousands of cases—in the
difficult business of setting appropriate contingency fees. This new
judicial role may lead some critics to believe that the better option is to
exempt contingency-fee cases from litigation budgeting. But the
existence of litigation budgets considerably lessens the difficulty of
setting fees; the budget establishes the base fee that the lawyer has
earned, and the court will have a good sense of the actual risk that the
lawyer took on when it sets the proper percentage. With time and
experience, the process of setting fees will become simpler. Whatever
its drawbacks, judicial fee-setting in contingency-fee cases is essential

189. I assume a standard contingency fee, in which the lawyer receives one-third of any
recovery. Thus, to garner an additional $300 in fees, the value of the case must increase by $900.
190. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 93, at 546–50. Under this plan, the amount of the
fee would ultimately be capped by the size of the plaintiff’s recovery. Id. at 546–47. Their proposal
mentions, and subsequent work based on the proposal emphasizes, the importance of using the
plaintiff’s net recovery (gross recovery less nonfee expenses) when calculating the appropriate riskpremium percentage. See id. at 557–58; Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 788 (2014) (“[W]hen calculating the percentage-of-the-fund portion of the
fee, the court must use the net recovery to the class, rather than the gross recovery, as the fund of
which counsel may receive a percentage.”).
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if a litigation-budgeting process and, more generally, control of
litigation costs are to be successful.
2. Gamesmanship
In an adversarial system, any rule is likely to be used in
unintended ways. Litigation budgeting is not immune to the problem.
Each side will adopt strategies in setting their original budgets that
seek to minimize the other side’s access to litigation resources and
maximize their own. In conducting litigation, each side will have an
incentive to act in ways that exhaust the other side’s budget while
holding on to as much of their own as possible. Litigation could become
a battle in which victory goes to the party with the last dollar to spend.
Of course, in some sense this reality is already true; litigation
budgeting shifts the tactics but not the goal of exhausting your
opponent’s resources before your own. In a litigation-budget world,
courts must be especially vigilant about stonewalling and documentdump tactics that could eat up substantial portions of an opponent’s
resources. 191 Sanctions that punish such behavior by reducing an
offending party’s own budget are necessary, but, as I have explained,
sanctions that are effective in preventing wasteful obstreperous
behavior are also at hand. 192 These sanctions, however, also create a
new opportunity for satellite litigation designed to exhaust an
opponent. 193
Indeed, the line-item nature of the litigation budgets is likely to
decrease some forms of gamesmanship. Parties will not be able to spend
more than a determined amount on each phase of the litigation. As a
case moves to a new phase (say from pleading to discovery, or from
discovery to dispositive motions to trial), new resources become
available. It would no longer be possible, as it is now, to spend an
opponent out of court just during the discovery phase of the case.
Nonetheless, it would be Pollyannaish to suggest that litigation
budgeting will have no untoward effects on the conduct of litigation.
Despite this reality, the purpose of the system—to keep litigation costs
within manageable bounds—must be kept in focus. The complaints
about the expense of modern litigation are legion. Parties are exiting
191. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
192. For some potential uses of this sanctioning power, see supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
193. See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 625–26 & nn.
258–60 (1998) (stating that there had been only nineteen reported decisions under Rule 11 before
the strengthening of its sanctions in 1983, while 6,947 reported cases had cited Rule 11 between
1983 and June 1993).
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litigation to resolve disputes through settlement, mediation, and
arbitration in no small measure because litigation is too costly. 194 If
litigation is to survive and thrive in the marketplace of disputeresolution alternatives, it must adapt and become less costly. Other
strategies have proven ineffective. Litigation budgeting creates
opportunities for gamesmanship and thus requires policing. In cases in
which the court limits budgets, more policing may mean more
reductions in the parties’ own budgets. In this sense, a litigation-budget
world gives the parties more incentive to cooperate and to reserve their
disputes to issues that matter.
C. Objection Three: The Court’s Authority
Regulating the amount of money that parties expend on
litigation constitutes a significant change in American litigation—one
that raises issues of judicial power. Except in class actions 195 and cases
that involve fee shifting, 196 courts have been reluctant to involve
themselves in setting lawyers’ fees and regulating other litigation
expenses. Whether they lack the power to do so is a different matter.
1. Rulemaking Issues
The first question is whether courts possess the rulemaking
authority to promulgate litigation-budget rules. In federal court, the
Rules Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to “prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure,” 197 but only if these rules do “not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 198 The Court has
interpreted the Rules Enabling Act to provide a broad power to

194. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 1777–78
(2014) (“Merchants may view arbitration as cheaper, faster, and less transparent than litigation.”);
Note, Mediation of Investor-State Conflicts, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2543, 2551 (2014) (“Starting in the
1970s, a ‘corporate-consumer revolution against litigation costs’ led in-house counsel to consider
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and especially mediation, for resolving business disputes.”
(citing Ellen Joan Pollock, The Alternate Route, AM. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 70)).
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”).
Courts have tended to compensate counsel either by awarding fees for hours worked (the lodestar
approach, in which the court may enhance the market rate by a multiplier if the case is highly
successful) or by awarding a percentage of the recovery. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc.,
209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a court has discretion to calculate class counsel’s fee
on either a lodestar or a percentage basis).
196. See supra note 15 (discussing fee shifting in American courts).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012).
198. Id. § 2072(b).
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promulgate procedural rules even when they have “incidental effects”
on substantive rights. 199
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that litigation budgets fall within the
Supreme Court’s power. In the United Kingdom, the Civil Procedure
Rule Committee promulgated the costs-budget system without
Parliamentary approval, but extensive preexisting provisions regarding
cost shifting and the integration of costs budgeting into those provisions
make British costs budgeting seem a less “substantive” and more
“procedural” matter than litigation budgeting would be in the United
States. 200 The regulation of attorney’s fees, especially the change in
contingency fees, suggests strongly that the effects of a litigationbudget system on substantive rights are not “incidental.” Therefore,
costs budgeting likely exceeds the scope of rulemaking under the Rules
Enabling Act. Adopting costs budgeting in the federal courts requires
congressional authorization.
Wending such a system through a political as opposed to a
rulemaking process presents substantial practical challenges that
affect the prospects for adoption of litigation budgeting. Lawmakers
must be satisfied about the wisdom of the policy goal of preventing
socially wasteful litigation practices, as well as about the wisdom of
litigation budgeting as a means to achieve that goal. I return to this
practical point in the Conclusion, after considering other legal
impediments to budgeting.
2. Constitutional Concerns
Litigation budgeting brings into play a number of constitutional
provisions, such as the right to jury trial 201 or state open-courts or right-

199. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010)
(plurality opinion) (stating that the Enabling Act’s “limitation means that [a Federal] Rule must
‘really regulat[e] procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them’ ” (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941))); Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553–54 (1991) (“[T]he Rules Enabling Act is not violated
by . . . incidental effects on substantive rights.”). Whether the Court has correctly interpreted the
breadth of its rulemaking power is frequent fodder for academic debate. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh,
Foreword, Erie’s Gift, 44 AKRON L. REV. 897 (2011) (discussing how Shady Grove will affect the
definition of substantive and procedural rights under the Rules Enabling Act and Erie).
200. The award of costs was already the subject of detailed regulation in Parts 44–48 of the
Civil Procedure Rules. See SIME, supra note 116, § 46.01–47.15 (describing the system for awarding
costs).
201. For the federal right to a civil jury trial, see U.S. CONST. amend. VII. All but two
American states (Louisiana and Wyoming) have jury-trial rights of similar or greater breadth.
Robert Wilson, Note, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The Role of the Jury in the Pickering Test, 18
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 389, 401 n.116 (2008).
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to-remedy provisions. 202 But the fundamental arguments would likely
channel into two propositions: either litigation budgeting violates
litigants’ right to due process 203 or their rights to freedom of speech and
to petition the government. 204
a. Due Process. The due-process argument has only a limited
effect on litigation budgeting. On the civil side, due process guarantees
that parties have notice and an opportunity to be heard, 205 but it does
not guarantee access to a lawyer, much less an excessively expensive
lawyer of the party’s choosing. 206 If approved budgets provide the
parties with sufficient funds to be heard, the Due Process Clause should
act as no bar to a system of litigation budgeting.
Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause sounds one problematic
note for litigation budgets. In Mathews v. Eldridge, in which the Social
Security Administration failed to provide adversarial evidentiary
hearings before terminating benefits, the Supreme Court used a threefactor test to determine whether due process was satisfied. In essence,
a procedural rule was constitutional as long as the expected social
savings from its use exceeded any expected private loss due to the
additional inaccuracy of the nonadversarial procedure. 207 Litigation
budgeting, whose point is to ensure that the total costs of litigation do
not exceed the total gains, seems consonant with an understanding of
due process that is sensitive to balancing costs against benefits and that

202. See Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Essay, Gideon at Guantánamo: Democratic and
Despotic Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2511 (2013) (“[M]any state constitutions have textual
commitments to open courts and rights-to-remedies.”).
203. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
204. Id. at amend. I.
205. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
206. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) (holding that, as long as procedural
safeguards aiding accurate fact-finding are in place, “the Due Process Clause does not
automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent
individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration (for
up to a year)”).
207. The Court described the factors as follows:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Court continues to adhere to the Mathews due-process formulation.
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517–18; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
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allows courts to alter adversarial procedures in light of social needs. 208
But a potential problem arises because of a simple fact: using different
procedures can change the value of a claim. 209
Assume that, without litigation budgeting, a plaintiff was
prepared to spend $10,000 on a claim with a fifty percent chance of
returning $40,000 (in other words, a claim with an expected value of
$20,000). Further assume that the only value of the suit is the $20,000
private expected recovery, the costs of defense are also $10,000, and the
costs to the court are $3,000. It is evident that litigation budgeting is
necessary; the plaintiff has an incentive to bring suit (her net private
gain is $10,000) even though the social loss from the case is $3,000. Now
assume that the court adopts a draconian budget, limiting the
expenditures on each side to $1,000. Without the ability to obtain the
same level of proof, the plaintiff’s chances now fall to a forty percent
chance of recovering $10,000 (or $4,000); the costs to the court in
deciding the case decline to $1,000. The case is socially worthwhile (the
expected gain net of total costs is $1,000), but the plaintiff has lost
$12,000 (an expected net gain of $15,000 without budgeting as opposed
to an expected net gain of $3,000 with budgeting), while society has
gained only $4,000 (moving from a net loss of $3,000 without budgeting
to a net gain of $1,000 with budgeting). On these numbers, forcing the
parties to adhere to a litigation budget seems to violate Mathews.
But this analysis focuses on the wrong question. The Mathews
factors instruct courts to examine the due-process issue at the
macroscopic level: whether in general the total gains from litigation
budgeting are greater than the risk of losses to private litigants. 210 They
do not examine the application of the rule in a particular case.
Otherwise, many procedural rules that limit adversarial options—
including recent reforms that limit the scope and frequency of discovery
or raise the pleading bar—could be attacked on an as-applied basis. As
long as the total gains from litigation budgeting exceed the occasional

208. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (7th ed. 2007) (casting the
three Mathews factors into marginal-utility terms of expected gains versus expected losses).
209. For one discussion of the ways in which legal procedure inevitably affects the value of
legal claims, see Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 885–91
(2011).
210. In Mathews itself, the Supreme Court found that a nonadversarial process to determine
eligibility for Social Security disability benefits was constitutional even though no evidentiary
hearing was held before termination of the benefits. 424 U.S. at 349. In making this determination,
the Court weighed the overall benefits and costs of holding such evidentiary hearings, not the
particular benefits and costs in the petitioner’s specific case. Id. at 340–49.
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losses to private litigants unable to present as forceful a claim or
defense, no due-process issue arises. 211
This concern, however, suggests that a court should be
thoughtful about how it reduces budgets when it must do so. In the last
hypothetical, perhaps there exists a middle path between allowing the
plaintiff to spend her desired $10,000 and restricting the plaintiff to
spending $1,000—a path in which the plaintiff suffers less loss while
the social loss is still eliminated.
b. First Amendment. For cases in which a court trims a party’s
budget, litigation budgeting restricts the amount of money that parties
can spend on an activity sponsored by the government. On the surface,
therefore, litigation budgeting seems to run afoul of both Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 212 which held that statutory
restrictions on the amounts that corporations could spend on political
speech violated the First Amendment’s Speech Clause, 213 and
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 214 which held that
statutory restrictions on the aggregate amount that private parties
could contribute to political campaigns similarly violated the Speech
Clause.
Despite superficial similarities, however, the use of litigation
budgets presents no First Amendment difficulties. To begin, litigation
expenditures may not be “speech” that falls within the protection of the
First Amendment. Certain categories of expression—for instance,
obscenity, incitements to violence, or threats—are exempt from First
Amendment protection. 215 These exemptions are “historic and
traditional categories long familiar to the bar.” 216 Efforts to control the
cost of litigation also have a long pedigree 217 and have been a principal
211. It bears repeating that litigation budgeting does not affect or limit the parties’ ability to
spend the amounts that they wish to spend when (1) the private and public incentives to litigate
align and (2) both lawyers are paid by the hour. In these cases, the court’s only roles are to approve
the budgets and monitor compliance with them. See supra Part IV.B.1.a. The due-process concern
arises only when litigation is socially costly. Assuming that it works as intended, litigation
budgeting avoids those social costs in all of these cases, while the counterbalancing risk of private
deprivation of claim value arises only in some of the cases.
212. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
213. Id. at 336–41; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
214. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). McCutcheon left in place the $2,600 limit that an individual could
contribute to a single political campaign. See id. at 1442, 1453 (discussing the $2,600 limit).
215. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010).
216. Id. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991)).
217. See, e.g., Rainey v. W.R. Grace & Co., 231 U.S. 703, 707 (1914) (noting that the “main
purpose” of a recent act of Congress was “to reduce the expense of records upon which cases may
be taken”); Henry G. Newton, The United States Bankruptcy Law of 1898, 9 YALE L.J. 287, 287
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focus of procedural reform for more than thirty years. 218 At no point has
there been a suggestion that reforms limiting the costliness of litigation
create a First Amendment difficulty, even though some of the
restrictions—such as limits on the length or number of depositions, 219
limits on the number of days of trial, 220 or limits on the number of pages
in briefs 221—could be seen as efforts to limit a litigant’s right of free
expression.
None of these other procedural restrictions, however, directly
limits the amount of money that parties can spend on litigation.
Moreover, as United States v. Stevens made clear, speech does not lose
its protected quality merely because the costs of speech outweigh its
benefits—which is precisely the argument for litigation budgets. 222 The
First Amendment arguments have particular force if the approved
budgets are so restrictive that a party is unable to articulate its legal
views despite its willingness to spend money to do so.
Even granting these arguments, litigation budgeting is akin to
other “time, place, and manner” restrictions on the use of a governmentsponsored forum (in this case, a courtroom). Such restrictions must be
content-neutral, reasonable, applied without stifling free expression,
leave open alternative means for communicating the information, and
contain “adequate standards to guide the [judge’s] decision and render
it subject to effective judicial review.” 223 As long as a judge acts evenhandedly in applying the principles that trim budgets, litigation
budgeting should pass constitutional muster.
Indeed, restrictions like limited trial time or word limits on a
brief impose far more direct limits on the ability to speak than limits on
(1900) (stating that one of the objects of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was “[t]o reduce the fees and
expenses to a minimum, . . . and thereby to provide that the assets of the bankrupt shall go to his
creditors rather than to officers and lawyers”); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, Address Before the American Bar Association
Annual Convention (1906), in 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 288 (1964)
(calling for reforms to American procedure to avoid “the waste and delay caused by archaic judicial
organization and obsolete procedure”).
218. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
219. See FED R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (presumptively limiting depositions to ten per side); FED
R. CIV. P.; 30(d)(1) (presumptively limiting the duration of each deposition to seven hours).
220. See Monotype Corp. v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 450–51 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
no abuse of discretion when a district court imposed a trial time limit of nine days, even though a
party had requested three weeks).
221. See SUP. CT. R. 33.1(g) (establishing word limits for various briefs); FED. R. APP. P.
32(a)(7) (same).
222. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee
of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.”).
223. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002); see Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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the amount of money that parties may spend, yet such restrictions have
never been successfully attacked as violations of the First
Amendment. 224 In addition, the directness of the restriction should not
matter. If the effort to limit costs through costs budgets is
constitutionally infirm, then are not all attempts to restrict a party’s
ability to spend unlimited money on its case equally suspect? Perhaps
the best analogy is to the one part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act that survived First Amendment scrutiny. Even if Citizens United
allows a person to spend as much money as it wants to explain its
political views to the public, McCutcheon did not strike down provisions
of the Act that allowed the government to regulate the amount of money
that a party contributed to a specific political candidate’s campaign. 225
The same should hold true for litigation: the amount of money that a
party can spend in court may be properly limited.
As with the due process argument, however, the First
Amendment argument sounds a note of caution for judges. When they
set litigation budgets, they should not let their disagreement about the
nature of the claim or defense affect their decision. On the other hand,
even-handed and cost-effective restrictions on litigation spending
should pose no First Amendment issues. 226
V. CONCLUSION
Even if courts have the power to require litigation budgets, a
separate issue is whether they should do so. Litigation budgeting
presents a Rorschach test about a person’s views on the importance of
limiting litigation costs. Some may see in litigation budgets the newest
224. A search of the Westlaw database found no cases raising the argument.
225. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442, 1453 (2014) (discussing the $2,600 limit).
226. Distinct from the First Amendment’s Speech Clause is the Petition Clause. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). “[T]he Petition Clause protects the right of
individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of
legal disputes.” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 U.S. 2488, 2494 (2011). But see id. at 2501
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I seriously doubt that lawsuits are ‘petitions’ within the original
meaning of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.”); id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (“I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally
protected ‘Petition’ quite doubtful.”). The right to petition a court does not mean, however, that
litigants must be allowed to spend whatever sums they wish on litigation. The Court has
recognized that, “[i]n recognition of the substantial costs imposed by litigation,” Congress may,
without running afoul of the Petition Clause, employ strategies, such as sanctions for filing
frivolous claims, that encourage appropriate use of the courts. Id. at 2496. Furthermore, although
they are not necessarily identical due to the distinct functions of the two clauses, the tests for
violations of the Speech and Petition Clauses often converge. Id. at 2495, 2500. Because litigation
budgeting creates no issues under the Speech Clause, it should pose no problem under the Petition
Clause—assuming that the Petition Clause even applies to lawsuits.
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manifestation of the creeping and dangerous power of courts to control
litigation. Some may be especially uncomfortable with the way in which
budgets will regulate, both directly and indirectly, attorney’s fees. Some
may prefer a far less radical campaign to trim costs around the margin,
which is the largely ineffective strategy to which we are presently
committed. Some may prefer the status quo of costly litigation, either
because they profit from it or because excessive expenses push cases
into other forms of dispute resolution that are less transparent and
more easily manipulated to their advantage. Some may be attracted to
the idea of litigation budgets in theory but are skeptical about whether
it can work in practice. And some might think it wiser to wait ten or
fifteen years to learn from the British experience with costs budgeting.
For these reasons, many may not see the present game of cutting
litigation costs as worth the candle if its logical endpoint is judicial
control of parties’ litigation budgets.
The desire for modest, cautious, and judicious reform is
understandable. But such reform is not working. If we are serious about
controlling litigation costs and about controlling the hemorrhaging of
litigation into other forms of dispute resolution, something innovative
is required. The litigation budget is the best option to counteract the
parties’ desire to overspend on litigation. Litigation budgets are
admittedly radical, but they keep litigation costs within socially
appropriate bounds. If we are truly committed to this ideal, the
argument for litigation budgeting is simple indeed.

